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ABSTRACT
CODING AGAINST STRAGGLERS IN DISTRIBUTED
COMPUTATION SCENARIOS
by
Malihe Aliasgari
Data and analytics capabilities have made a leap forward in recent years. The
volume of available data has grown exponentially. The huge amount of data needs to
be transferred and stored with extremely high reliability. The concept of “coded
computing”, or a distributed computing paradigm that utilizes coding theory to
smartly inject and leverage data/computation redundancy into distributed computing
systems, mitigates the fundamental performance bottlenecks for running large-scale
data analytics.
In this dissertation, a distributed computing framework, first for input files
distributedly stored on the uplink of a cloud radio access network architecture, is
studied. It focuses on that decoding at the cloud takes place via network function
virtualization on commercial off-the-shelf servers. In order to mitigate the impact of
straggling decoders in this platform, a novel coding strategy is proposed, whereby
the cloud re-encodes the received frames via a linear code before distributing them
to the decoding processors. Transmission of a single frame is considered first, and
upper bounds on the resulting frame unavailability probability as a function of the
decoding latency are derived by assuming a binary symmetric channel for uplink
communications. Then, the analysis is extended to account for random frame arrival
times. In this case, the trade-off between an average decoding latency and the frame
error rate is studied for two different queuing policies, whereby the servers carry
out per-frame decoding or continuous decoding, respectively. Numerical examples
demonstrate that the bounds are useful tools for code design and that coding is

instrumental in obtaining a desirable compromise between decoding latency and
reliability.
In the second part of this dissertation large matrix multiplications are considered
which are central to large-scale machine learning applications. These operations are
often carried out on a distributed computing platform with a master server and
multiple workers in the cloud operating in parallel. For such distributed platforms,
it has been recently shown that coding over the input data matrices can reduce the
computational delay, yielding a trade-off between recovery threshold, i.e., the number
of workers required to recover the matrix product, and communication load, and the
total amount of data to be downloaded from the workers. In addition to exact recovery
requirements, security and privacy constraints on the data matrices are imposed, and
the recovery threshold as a function of the communication load is studied. First,
it is assumed that both matrices contain private information and that workers can
collude to eavesdrop on the content of these data matrices. For this problem, a novel
class of secure codes is introduced, referred to as secure generalized PolyDot codes,
that generalize state-of-the-art non-secure codes for matrix multiplication. Secure
generalized PolyDot codes allow a flexible trade-off between recovery threshold and
communication load for a fixed maximum number of colluding workers while providing
perfect secrecy for the two data matrices. Then, a connection between secure matrix
multiplication and private information retrieval is studied. It is assumed that one of
the data matrices is taken from a public set known to all the workers. In this setup,
the identity of the matrix of interest should be kept private from the workers. For
this model, a variant of generalized PolyDot codes is presented that can guarantee
both secrecy of one matrix and privacy for the identity of the other matrix for the
case of no colluding servers.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

For over fifty years, people have been trying to follow Moores law and to increase the
number of transistors on a circuit by making the transistors smaller. However, this
trend is going end sometime inevitably, due to the limit imposed by power density
issues. There may be other types of breakthrough technologies that can make the
computation components even smaller and faster, but the main point is that the
fundamental theory of transistors may not apply any more to the new devices and
platforms. The inevitable saturation of Moores law has made researchers look into
the possibility and increasing size and dimension of data, system designers have
increasingly resorted to parallel and distributed computing to reduce the computation
time of machine-learning algorithms.
Distributed computing has become the basis for all large-scale computation.
The ability to distribute work over many processors and utilize their combined
computational power to run large tasks in parallel has become necessary with the
increasing size of data sets and task complexity.
All these breakthroughs were made possible only due to the scalability in
computing and storage capacity offered by modern large-scale clusters. While classical
computing and storage clusters were composed of a small number of expensive,
custom-designed high-end machines, modern large-scale clusters consist of more than
tens of thousands of hardware nodes, connected through general-purpose network
infrastructure.
In order to develop and deploy sophisticated solutions and tackle large-scale
problems in machine learning, science, and engineering, it is important to understand
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and optimize novel and complex trade-offs across the multiple dimensions of
computation, communication, and storage.
One of the most serious issues facing distributed computing is that processors
take randomly varying amounts of time to finish, which means that all too frequently,
when a task is divided into N parts amongst N processors, several will straggle. In
these traditional schemes, one needs to wait for all processors to finish computing
before the job is done, resulting in increasing latency. Most current research in
this domain focuses on replicating the work of straggling processors by giving their
job to processors that have already finished. However, these approaches increase
communication and coordination cost, two bottlenecks in most systems. We tackle
the straggler problem arising in distributed computing by assigning redundant
computations to nodes derived through error correcting codes.
In this dissertation, distributed computing systems are viewed through a codingtheoretic lens. The role of codes in providing resiliency against noise has been studied
for decades in many other engineering contexts, especially in communication systems,
and is part of our everyday infrastructure (smartphones, laptops, WiFi and cellular
systems, etc.). Since the performance of distributed systems is also significantly
affected by the system behavior and bottlenecks, which we call “system noise”, there
is an exciting opportunity for codes to endow distributed systems with robustness
against such system noise.

1.1

Main Contribution of this Dissertation

The backbone of this dissertation consists of two main parts: coded computation
for network function virtualization and coded computation for large matrix multiplication. The role of codes for each of these parts is addressed in this dissertation, and
the main contributions are summarized as follows.

2

• The first contribution of the dissertation is to propose coded computing to
enable reliable and timely channel decoding in a cloud radio access
network architecture based on distributed unreliable processors.
Codes transform the evolution of large-scale distributed storage systems in
modern data centers, which have a major impact on industry. The implementation of channel decoding in the cloud by means of network function
virtualization is faced with the challenge of providing reliable operation despite
the unreliability of commercial off-the-shelf servers. The proposed coded
network function virtualization solution leverages the algebraic structure of the
transmitted coded data frames in order to enhance the robustness of channel
decoding constraint.
• Runtime performance of distributed algorithms is heavily affected by stragglers,
i.e., “processors lagging behind in the execution of a certain orchestrated
function”, which we show to significantly improve the latency by using
coded computation against processing delays for network function
virtualization.
• Linear codes are used in forward error correction and are applied in methods
for transmitting symbols (e.g., bits) on a communications channel so that, if
errors occur in the communication, some errors can be corrected or detected by
the recipient of a message block. As a byproduct of the analysis we introduce
the dependency graph of a linear code and its chromatic number
as novel relevant parameters of a linear code beside minimum distance,
blocklength, and rate.
• Fast content download is one of the major user demands. Content download
time includes the time taken for a user to compete with the other users
to access to the processors, and the time to acquire the data from the
processors. In this dissertation a transmission of a single frame is considered
first. Then, we analyze random frame arrival times in network function
virtualization. In this case, the trade-off between an average decoding latency
and the frame error rate is studied for two different queuing policies, whereby
the servers carry out per-frame decoding or continuous decoding.
• A rapid growth of large-scale machine learning and big data analytics,
facilitating the developments of data-intensive applications. Faced with the
saturation of Moores law and increasing size and dimension of data, system
designers have increasingly resorted to parallel and distributed computing to
reduce computation time of machine-learning algorithms. For computing large
matrix multiplications, we introduce a novel perspective on distributed
computing codes based on the signal processing concepts of convolution and z-transform.
• Finally, the phenomenal growth in computing power over much of the past
five decades has been motivated by scientific applications demanding, highperformance parallel computing. The data tends to be distributed, and issues
3

such as privacy and security. To this end, we impose security and privacy
constraints on large data matrices, and study the recovery threshold
as a function of the communication load.

1.2

Related Works

In this section, we provide a high-level overview of some selected related works. More
extensive surveys of the related works are provided in the following chapters.

1.2.1

Distributed Coded Computation

The era of Big Data and the immensity of real-life datasets compels computation
tasks to be performed in a distributed fashion, where the data is dispersed among
many servers that operate in parallel. Coding has always played a fundamental role
in information propagation, e.g., in communication systems [95] and storage systems
[30]. In this dissertation, we aim to develop this understanding of coding theory and
techniques from communication systems to the much broader field of computation
system.
Sometimes, the code is applied in such a way that the communicated messages,
instead of the data, are encoded, for instance in, [66, 71, 102, 111, 36, 13, 72, 7, 6, 8,
84]. In this case, the data is essentially replicated, and the replication factor, which
relates to the density of the code, directly determines the overhead in both storage
and computation time. Although the main observation is that the communication
time may dominate the overall time cost, and hence increasing the computation time
may be acceptable, it is desirable that the overall storage cost does not increase by
much. Thus, a sparse code is more desirable than a dense code.

1.2.2

Straggler Mitigation

Stragglers are one of the main reasons why the actual speed-up of a parallelized
computation is always worse than the theoretical speed-up predicted by Amdahl’s
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Law [10, 86]. A straggler is a processor which is still working on its share of the
parallelized computation when most or all of the other processors have completed
their shares.

It is shown that running a computational task at parallel servers

involves unpredictable latency due to several factors such as network latency, shared
resources, maintenance activities, and power limits [12, 28]. Moreover, the stragglers
cannot be completely removed from a distributed computing cluster. One approach
to mitigate the adverse effect of stragglers is based on efficient straggler detection
algorithms.

For instance, in order to combat with stragglers, cloud computing

frame works like Hadoop [96] employ various straggler detection techniques and
usually reset the task allotted to stragglers. Another line of approaches is based
on forward error-correction techniques offer an alternative approach to deal with this
straggler effect by introducing redundancy in the computational tasks across different
processors. The fusion or master node now requires outputs from only a subset of all
the processors to successfully finish. The use of preliminary erasure codes dates back
to the ideas of algorithmic fault tolerance [33]. Adding redundancy has also been
proposed as a way to tackle the straggler problem: by replicating tasks the runtime
of distributed algorithms can be significantly improved [62, 11, 93, 67, 42, 106, 24].
By collecting outputs of the fast-responding nodes (and potentially cancelling all
the other slow-responding replicas), such replication-based scheduling algorithms can
reduce latency.

1.2.3

Distributed Matrix Multiplication

At the core of many signal processing, machine learning applications, scientific
computing, and graph processing are tensor operations, most notably large matrix
multiplications [51]. Many such applications require processing terabytes or even
petabytes of data, which needs massive computation and storage resources that
cannot be provided by a single machine. Hence, deploying matrix computation tasks
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on large-scale distributed systems has received wide interest [21, 25, 104, 97]. There
is also a lot of interest in classical Algorithm-Based Fault Tolerance literature, e.g.,
[49, 45] and more recently in distributed coded computation literature, to make matrix
multiplications resilient to faults and delays. An important problem in distributed
matrix multiplication is to consider the case where the inputs are encoded and
multiplied in a block-wise manner. This setup generalizes the problem formulated
in [111] to enable a more flexible trade-off between resources such as storage,
computation and communication,and has been studied in [68, 112, 39, 8, 81, 52].

1.2.4

Secret Sharing Schemes

Secret sharing refers to any method for distributing a secret among a group of
participants, each of which allocates a share of the secret. The secret can only be
reconstructed when the shares are combined together; individual shares are of no use
on their own. Secret-sharing schemes were introduced by Blakley [18] and Shamir [94]
independently for the threshold case, that is, for the case where the subsets that can
reconstruct the secret are all the sets whose cardinality is at least a certain threshold.
The volume of data continues to rapidly grow as information pours from various
platforms. This has motivated the fast development of scalable, interpretable, and
fault-tolerant distributed computing frameworks. In distributed computing systems
Over a general network, all communication between the fusion node and a participant
or processors, who is not directly connected to it, must pass through other participants
in the network. The fact that often the data is confidential and processors are curious
and untrusted poses the challenge of secret sharing over a network without leaking
any additional information to any processors [81, 113, 22, 56, 107, 27].
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1.2.5

Private Information Retrieval

The most efficient way for a user to retrieve a desired message from a set of distributed
servers, each of which stores all the messages, without revealing any information
about which message is being retrieved to any individual server is given as the
private information retrieval problem. The user can hide his interests trivially by
requesting all the information, but that could be very inefficient (expensive). The
goal of the private information retrieval problem is to find the most efficient solution
in terms of download complexity. The private information retrieval problem was
introduced in 1995 [25, 26] and of broad interest because it shares intimate connections
to many other prominent problems [44, 40, 3, 15, 16, 94].

Private information

retrieval also connects distributed data storage repair [31], index coding [17] and
matrix multiplication [108]. As such, private information retrieval holds tremendous
promise as a point of convergence of complementary perspectives.

1.3

Dissertation Outline

The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2. We consider the uplink of a cloud radio access network architecture
in which decoding at the cloud takes place via network function virtualization on
commercial off-the-shelf servers. In order to mitigate the impact of straggling decoders
in this platform, a novel coding strategy is proposed, whereby the cloud re-encodes the
received frames via a linear code before distributing them to the decoding processors.
Transmission of a single frame is considered first, and upper bounds on the resulting
frame unavailability probability as a function of the decoding latency are derived
by assuming a binary symmetric channel for uplink communications. Then, the
analysis is extended to account for random frame arrival times. In this case, the
trade-off between an average decoding latency and the frame error rate is studied for
two different queuing policies, whereby the servers carry out per-frame decoding or
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continuous decoding, respectively. Numerical examples demonstrate that the bounds
are useful tools for code design and that coding is instrumental in obtaining a desirable
compromise between decoding latency and reliability.
Chapter 3. In addition to the exact recovery requirements of two large matrix
multiplications, we impose security and privacy constraints on the data matrices,
and study the recovery threshold as function of the communication load. We first
assume that both matrices contain private information and that workers can collude to
eavesdrop on the content of these data matrices. We introduce a novel class of secure
codes, referred to as secure generalized PolyDot codes, that generalize state-of-the-art
non-secure codes for matrix multiplication. We then study a connection between
secure matrix multiplication and private information retrieval. For this model, we
present a variant of generalized PolyDot codes that can guarantee both secrecy of one
matrix and privacy for the identity of the other matrix for the case of no colluding
servers.
Chapter 4. We conclude the dissertation with the summary of the results and
important future research directions.
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CHAPTER 2
CODED COMPUTATION AGAINST PROCESSING DELAYS IN
NETWORK FUNCTION VIRTUALIZATION

2.1

Introduction

Promoted by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), network
function virtualization has become a cornerstone of the envisaged architecture for 5G
systems [77]. Network function virtualization leverages virtualization technologies in
order to implement network functionalities on commercial off-the-shelf programmable
hardware, such as general purpose servers, potentially reducing both capital and
operating costs. An important challenge in the deployment of network function
virtualization is ensuring carrier grade performance while relying on commercial
off-the-shelf components. Such components may be subject to temporary unavailability due to malfunctioning, and are generally characterized by randomness in their
execution runtimes. The typical solution to these problems involves replicating the
virtual machines that execute given network functions on multiple processors, e.g.,
cores or servers [1, 75, 46, 57].
Among the key applications of network function virtualization is the implementation of centralized radio access functionalities in a cloud radio access network
[78, 2]. As shown in Figure 2.1, each remote radio head of a cloud radio access
network architecture is connected to a cloud processor by means of a fronthaul link.
Baseband functionalities are carried out on a distributed computing platform in
the cloud, which can be conveniently programmed and reconfigured using network
function virtualization. The most expensive baseband function in terms of latency to
be carried out at the cloud is uplink channel decoding [78, 9, 79].
The implementation of channel decoding in the cloud by means of network
function virtualization is faced not only with the challenge of providing reliable
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operation despite the unreliability of commercial off-the-shelf servers, but also with
the latency constraints imposed by retransmission protocols. In particular, keeping
decoding latency at a minimum is a major challenge in the implementation of cloud
radio access network owing to timing constraints from the link-layer retransmission
protocols [34, 90, 60]. In fact, positive or negative feedback signals need to be sent
to the users within a strict deadline in order to ensure the proper operation of the
protocol. In [87, 88] it is argued that exploiting parallelism across multiple cores in
the cloud can reduce the decoding latency by enabling decoding as soon as one can has
computed its task. However, parallel processing does not address the unreliability of
commercial off-the-shelf hardware. A different solution is needed in order to address
both unreliability and delays associated with cloud decoding.
The problem of straggling processors, that is, of processors lagging behind in
the execution of a certain orchestrated function, has been well studied in the context
of distributed computing [29, 12, 114, 72, 71, 70]. Recently, it has been pointed out
that, for the important case of linear functions, it is possible to improve over repetition
strategies in terms of the trade-off between performance and latency by carrying out
linear precoding of the data prior to processing, e.g., [65, 73, 109, 101, 36, 92, 111, 76,
63]. The key idea is that, by employing suitable linear (erasure) block codes operating
over fractions of size 1/K of the original data, a function may be completed as soon
as any K or more processors, depending on the minimum distance of the code, have
completed their operations. Coding has also been found to be useful addressing the
straggler problem in the context of coded distributed storage and computing systems,
see, e.g., [106, 55, 11, 108, 4].
In this dissertation, we explore the use of coded computing to enable reliable
and timely channel decoding in a cloud radio access network architecture based on
distributed unreliable processors. Specifically, we formally and systematically address
the analysis of coded network function virtualization for cloud radio access network

10

uplink decoding. The only prior work on coded computing for network function
virtualization is [5], which provides numerical results concerning a toy example with
three processors in which a processor in the cloud is either on or off. Unlike [5], in
this work, we derive analytical performance bounds for a general scenario with any
number of servers, random computing runtimes, and random packet arrivals. Specific
novel contributions are as follows.

• We first consider the transmission of an isolated frame, and develop analytical
upper bounds on the frame unavailability probability as a function of the allowed
decoding delay. The frame unavailability probability measures the probability
that a frame is correctly decoded within a tolerated delay constraint. The frame
unavailability probability bounds leverage large deviation results for correlated
variables [50] and depend on the properties of both the uplink linear channel
code adopted at the user and the network function virtualization linear code
applied at the cloud;
• As a byproduct of the analysis we introduce the dependency graph of a linear
code and its chromatic number as novel relevant parameters of a linear code
beside minimum distance, blocklength, and rate;
• We extend the analysis to account for random frame arrival times, and
investigate the trade-off between average decoding latency and frame error rate
(FER) for two different queuing policies, whereby the servers carry out either
per-frame or continuous decoding;
• We provide extensive numerical results that demonstrate the usefulness of
the derived analytical bounds in both predicting the system performance and
enabling the design of network function virtualization codes.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we review some
technical background and preliminaries for the rest of this chapter. In Section 3.2, we
present the system model focusing, as in [5], on a binary symmetric channel (BSC) for
uplink communications. Section 2.4 presents the two proposed upper bounds on the
frame unavailability probability as a function of latency. In Section 2.5 we study the
proposed system with random frame arrival times, and Section 2.6 provides numerical
results.
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2.2
2.2.1

Technical Background and Preliminaries

Large Deviation for Dependent Random Variables

Many random variables can be written as a sum
X=

X

Yα

(2.1)

α∈A

of simpler random variables Yα , with ranging over some index set. For example, each
Yα may be an indicator variable taking the values 0 and 1 only, i.e. Yα ∼ Bern(pα )
for some pα ∈ [0, 1]. In this dissertation, we are interested in situations where the
variables Yα may be dependent, but there is a large amount of independence among
them. A typical situation is the sum
X=

X

fi1 ···id (ξi1 , . . . , ξid ),

(2.2)

i1 ···id

for some functions fi1 ···id and independent random variables ξi1 , . . . , ξid , and some set
A ⊆ [n]d< , where [n]d< is the set of all d-tuples (i1 , . . . , id ) with i1 < · · · < id ≤ n. Here
d and n are some positive integers; typically d is small (perhaps only 2 or 3) and n is
large. One example of such sums (2.2) is the family of U -statistics [47], which is the
symmetric case obtained by taking ξi1 , . . . , ξid independent and identically distributed,
all fi1 ···id equal to some symmetric function f , and A = [n]d< . More generally, if we
in this situation sum over a subset A ⊂ [n]d< , we obtain an incomplete U -statistic.
Also two sample U -statistics are of the general type (2.2), but now the ξi are of two
different types.
Definition 1. A dependency graph is a directed graph representing dependencies
of several objects towards each other. It is possible to derive an evaluation order
or the absence of an evaluation order that respects the given dependencies from the
dependency graph. More preciecly, for random variables Yα , α ∈ A, a graph Γ with
vertex set A such that if B ⊂ A and α ∈ A is not connected by an edge to any vertex
in B, then Yα is independent of {Yβ }β∈B .
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Definition 2. The chromatic number χ(Γ) of a graph Γ is the smallest number of
colors needed to color the vertices of Γ so that no two adjacent vertices share the same
color [105, page 334].
We can now state some results of [50], which we use in this chapter.
Theorem 1. Suppose that X is as in (2.1) with a aα ≤ Yα ≤ bα for every α ∈ A and
some real numbers aα and bα . Then for t > 0,


t2
P
P(X ≥ EX + t) ≤ exp −2
χ(Γ) α∈A (bα − aα )2

(2.3)

The same estimate holds for P(X ≥ EX − t).
Corollary 1. Suppose that X is as in (2.1) with Y α ∼ Be(pα ) for some pα ∈ (0, 1)
and all α ∈ A. Then, for t ≥ 0,
t2
P(X ≥ EX + t) ≤ exp −2
χ(Γ)|A|



.

(2.4)

The same estimate holds for P(X ≥ EX − t).
These results can be improved by Hoeffding’s methods [47, 48], when the
summands have variances that are substantially smaller than the upper bound
(bα − aα )2 /4. The following results holds for P(X ≤ EX − t). If the boundedness
assumption is reversed to Yα − EYα ≥ −b.
Theorem 2. Suppose that X is as (2.1) with Yα − EYα ≤ b for some b > 0 and all
α ∈ A. Then, with ϕ(x) defined as follows
∆

ϕ(x) = (1 + x) ln(1 + x) − x,
∆

and S =

P

α∈A

(2.5)

Var Yα , for t ≥ 0,
 
S
4bt
ϕ
P(X ≥ EX + t) ≤ exp − 2
b χ(Γ)
5S


2
8t
≤ exp −
.
25χ(Γ)(S + bt/3)
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(2.6)
(2.7)

Corollary 2. Suppose that X is as (2.1) with Yα ∼ Be(p) for some p ∈ (0, 1) and all
∆

α ∈ A. Let N = |A|. Then for t ≥ 0,



Np
4t
P(X ≥ EX + t) ≤ exp −
ϕ
(1 − p)χ(Γ)
5N p


2
8t
≤ exp −
;
25χ(Γ)(N p + t/3)



N (1 − p)
4t
P(X ≤ EX − t) ≤ exp −
ϕ
pχ(Γ)
5N (1 − p)


2
8t
P(X ≤ EX − t) ≤ exp −
.
25χ(Γ)N p

(2.8)
(2.9)
(2.10)
(2.11)

If a dependency graph Γ is given, then we may replace χ(Γ) by ∆(Γ), where
∆(Γ) denote the maximum degree of Γ. It can be easily seen that χ(Γ) ≤ ∆(Γ) + 1,
[19].

2.2.2

Queueing Theory

In this subsection, we review some concepts of a single server exponential queueing
theory which we use in Section 2.5.
Suppose that customers arrive at a single-server service station in accordance
with a Poisson process having rate λ. That is, the times between successive arrivals
are independent exponential random variables having mean 1/λ. Each customer,
upon arrival, goes directly into service if the server is free and, if not, the customer
joins the queue. When the server finishes serving a customer, the customer leaves the
system, and the next customer in line, if there is any, enters service. The successive
service times are assumed to be independent exponential random variables having
mean 1/µ.
The preceding is called the M/M/1 queue. The two M s refer to the fact
that both the inter arrival and the service distributions are exponential (and thus,
memoryless, or Markovian), and the 1 to the fact that there is a single server.
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Definition 3. The M/G/1 model assumes Poisson arrivals at rate λ; a general
service distribution; and a single server. In addition, we will suppose that customers
are served in the order of their arrival.
In parallel computing, the forkjoin model is a way of setting up and executing
parallel programs, such that execution branches off in parallel at designated points in
the program, to join (merge) at a subsequent point and resume sequential execution.
Parallel sections may fork recursively until a certain task granularity is reached.
Forkjoin can be considered a parallel design pattern [82]. This model is also called as
(n, n) fork-joint system.
Definition 4. [54] An (n, k) fork-join system consists of n nodes. Every arriving
job is divided into n tasks which enter first-come first-serve queues at each of the n
nodes. The job departs the system when any k out of n tasks are served by their
respective nodes. The remaining nk tasks abandon their queues and exit the system
before completion of service.
Definition 5. (Expected Latency).

The expected latency E[T ] is defined as the

expected time from the arrival of a task until any one replica is served. It includes
the waiting time in queue and the time spent at the servers until the task is served.
Although E[T ] is a good indicator of the average behavior, system designers
are often interested in the tail P r(T > t) of the latency.

For many queueing

problems, determining the distribution of response time T requires the assumption of
exponential service time.

2.3

System Model

As illustrated in Figure 2.1, we consider the uplink of a cloud radio access network
system in which a user communicates with the cloud via a remote radio head (RRH).
The user is connected to the remote radio head via a BSC with cross error probability
15

Figure 2.1

Network function virtualization model for uplink channel decoding. The
input information frame u is divided into packets, which are encoded with a linear code
Cu with generator matrix Gu . The packets are received by the remote radio head (RRH)
through a BSC and forwarded to the cloud. Server 0 in the cloud re-encodes the received
packet with a linear code Cc in order to enhance the robustness against potentially straggling
Servers 1, . . . , N .

δ, while the remote radio head-to-cloud link, typically referred to as fronthaul, is
assumed to be noiseless. Note that the BSC is a simple model for the uplink channel,
while the noiseless fronthaul accounts for a typical deployment with higher capacity
fiber optic cables. The analysis can be generalized to other additive noise channel,
such as Gaussian channels. The cloud contains a master server, or Server 0, and N
slave servers, i.e., Servers 1, . . . , N . The slave servers are characterized by random
computing delays as in related works on coded computation [65, 73, 92]. Note that we
use here the term “server” to refer to a decoding processor, although, in a practical
implementation, this may correspond to a core of the cloud computing platform [87,
88].
In the first part of this chapter, we consider transmission of a single information
frame u, while Section 2.5 focuses on random frame arrival times and queuing effect
delays.

The user encodes an information frame u consisting of L bits.

Before

encoding, the information frame is divided into K blocks u1 , u2 , . . . , uK ∈ {0, 1}L/K
of equal size, each of them containing L/K bits. As shown in Figure 2.1, in order
to combat noise on the BSC, the L/K blocks are encoded by an (n, k) binary linear

16

Figure 2.2

Coded Network function virtualization at the cloud: Server 0 re-encodes the
received packets in Y by a linear network function virtualization code Cc with generator
Gc . Each encoded packet ỹi is then conveyed to Server i for decoding.

code Cu of rate r = k/n defined by generator matrix Gu ∈ Fn×k
, where n = L/(rK)
2
and k = L/K. Let xj ∈ {0, 1}n with j ∈ {1, . . . , K} be the K transmitted packets of
length n. At the output of the BSC, the length-n received vector for the jth packet
at the remote radio head is given as
yj = xj ⊕ z j ,

where zj is a vector of i.i.d.

Bern(δ) random variables (rvs).

(2.12)

The K received

packets (y1 , y2 , . . . , yK ) by the remote radio head are transmitted to the cloud via
the fronthaul link, and the cloud performs decoding. Specifically, as detailed next,
we assume that each Server 1, . . . , N performs decoding of a single packet of length
n bits while Server 0 acts as coordinator.
Assuming N ≥ K, we adopt the idea of network function virtualization coding
proposed in [5]. Accordingly, as seen in Figure 2.2, the K packets are first linearly
encoded by Server 0 into N ≥ K coded blocks of the same length n bits, each
forwarded to a different server for decoding. This form of encoding is meant to
mitigate the effect of straggling servers in a manner similar to [65, 73, 92]. Using an
(N, K) binary linear network function virtualization code Cc with K × N generator
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matrix Gc ∈ F2N ×K , the encoded packets are obtained as
Ỹ = YGc ,

(2.13)

where Y = [y1 , . . . , yK ] is the n × K matrix obtained by including the received signal
yj as the jth column and Ỹ = [ỹ1 , . . . , ỹN ] is the n × N matrix whose ith column ỹi
is the input to Server i, where i ∈ {1, . . . , N }. From (2.12), this vector can be written
as
ỹi =

K
X
j=1

yj gc,ji =

K
X
j=1

xj gc,ji +

K
X

zj gc,ji ,

(2.14)

j=1

where gc,ji is the (j, i)th entry of matrix Gc .
P
The signal part K
j=1 xj gc,ji in (2.14) is a linear combination of di codewords for
the rate-r binary code with generator matrix Gu , and hence, it is a codeword of the
same code. The parameter di , i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, denotes the Hamming weight of the
ith column of matrix Gc , where 0 ≤ di ≤ K. Each server i receives as input ỹi from
P
which it can decode the codeword K
i=1 xi gc,ji . This decoding operation is affected
PK
by the noise vector j=1 zj gji in (2.14), which has i.i.d. Bern(γi ) elements. Here,
γi is obtained as the first row and second column’s entry of the matrix Qdi , with Q
being the transition matrix of the BSC with crossover probability δ, i.e.,


δ 
 1−δ
Q=
.
δ
1−δ

(2.15)

As an example, di = 2, implies a bit flipping probability of γi = 2δ(1 − δ). Note
that a larger value of di yields a larger bit probability γi . We define as Pn,k (γi ) the
decoding error probability of the (n, k) linear user code at Server i, which can be
upper bounded by using [83, Theorem 33].
Server i requires a random time Ti = T1,i + T2,i to complete decoding, which
is modeled as the sum of a component T1,i that is independent of the workload
and a component T2,i that instead grows with the size n of the packet processed
18

at each server, respectively.

The first component accounts, e.g., for processor

unavailability periods, while the second models the execution runtime from the start of
the computation. The first variable T1,i is assumed to have an exponential probability
density function (pdf) f1 (t) with mean 1/µ1 , while the variable T2,i has a shifted
exponential distribution with cumulative distribution function (cdf) [84]



rKµ2
L
t−a
,
F2 (t) = 1 − exp −
L
rK

(2.16)

for t ≥ aL/(rK) and F2 (t) = 0 otherwise. The parameter a represents the minimum
processing time per input bit, while 1/µ2 is the average additional time needed to
process one bit. As argued in [65, 84], the shifted exponential model provides a good
fit for the distribution of computation times over cloud computing environments such
as Amazon EC2 clusters. The cdf of the time Ti can hence be written as the integral
Rt
F (t) = 0 f1 (τ )F2 (t−τ )dτ . We also assume that the runtime rvs {Ti }N
i=1 are mutually
independent. Due to (2.16), the probability that a given set of l out of N servers has
finished decoding by time t is given as
 
N
al (t) =
F (t)l (1 − F (t))N −l .
l

(2.17)

Let dmin be the minimum distance of the network function virtualization code
Cc . Due to (2.14), Server 0 in the cloud is able to decode the message u or equivalently
the K packets uj for j ∈ {1, . . . , K}, as soon as N − dmin + 1 servers have decoded
successfully. Let ûi be the output of the ith server in the cloud upon decoding. We
assume that an error detection mechanism, such as a cyclic redundancy check (CRC),
is in place so that Server 0 outputs



ûi , for correct decoding,
ûi =


∅, otherwise.

19

The output û(t) of the decoder at Server 0 at time t is then a function of the vectors
ûi (t) for i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, where
ûi (t) =




ûi , if Ti ≤ t,


∅,

otherwise.

Finally, the frame unavailability probability at time t is defined as the probability
Pu (t) = Pr [û(t) 6= u] .

(2.18)

The event {û(t) 6= u} occurs when either not enough servers have completed decoding
or many servers have completed but failed decoding by time t. We also define the
FER as
Pe = lim Pu (t).
t→∞

(2.19)

The FER measures the probability that, when all servers have completed decoding,
a sufficiently large number, namely larger than N − dmin , has decoded successfully.

2.4

Bounds on the Frame Unavailability Probability

In this section, we derive analytical bounds on the frame unavailability probability
Pu (t) in (2.18) as a function of the decoding latency t.

2.4.1

Preliminaries

Each server i with i ∈ {1, . . . , N } decodes successfully its assigned packet ỹi if: (i )
the server completes decoding by time t; (ii ) the decoder at the server is able to
correct the errors caused by the BSC. Furthermore as discussed, an error at Server 0
occurs at time t if the number of servers that have successfully decoded by time t is
smaller than N − dmin + 1.
To evaluate the frame unavailability probability, we hence define the indicator
variables Ci (t) = 1{Ti ≤ t} and Di which are equal to 1 if the events (i ) and (ii )
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described above occur, respectively, and zero otherwise. Based on these definitions,
the frame unavailability probability is equal to
" N
#
X
Pu (t) = Pr
Ci (t)Di ≤ N − dmin .

(2.20)

i=1

The indicator variables Ci (t) are independent Bernoulli rvs across the servers i ∈
{1, . . . , N }, due to the independence assumption on the rvs Ti . However, the indicator
variable Di are dependent Bernoulli rvs. The dependence of the variables Di is caused
P
by the fact that the noise terms K
i=1 zj gc,ji in (2.14) generally have common terms.
In particular, if two columns i and j of the generator matrix Gc have at least a 1 in the
same row, then the decoding indicators Di and Dj are correlated. This complicates
the evaluation of bounds on the frame unavailability probability (2.20).

2.4.2

Dependency Graph and Chromatic Number of a Linear Code

To capture the correlation among the indicator variables Di , we introduce here the
notion of the dependency graph and its chromatic number for a linear code. These
appear to be novel properties of a linear code, and we will argue below that they
determine the performance of the network function virtualization code Cc for the
application at hand.
0

0

×N
Definition 6. Let G ∈ FK
be a generator matrix of a linear code. The dependency
2

graph G(G) = (V, E) comprises a set V of N 0 vertices and a set E ⊆ V × V of edges,
where edge (i, j) ∈ E is included if both the ith and jth columns of G have at least a
1 in the same row.
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Figure 2.3 Dependency graph associated with the (8,4) network function virtualization
code Cc in Example 1.

Example 1. For an (8, 4) network function virtualization code Cc with the following
generator matrix


 1 0

 0 0

Gc = 

 0 1

1 0


0 0 0 1 1 0 

0 1 1 0 0 1 

,

0 0 0 0 1 1 

1 0 1 0 0 0

(2.21)

the resulting dependency graph G(Gc ) is shown in Figure 2.3.
The chromatic number X (G) of the graph G(G) will play an important role in
the analysis. We recall that the chromatic number is the smallest number of colors
needed to color the vertices of G(G), such that no two adjacent vertices share the
same color (see the example in Figure 2.3). Generally, finding the chromatic number
of a graph is NP-hard [91]. However, a simple upper bound on X (G) is given as [20]
X (G) ≤ ∆(G) + 1,

(2.22)

where ∆(G) is the maximum degree of a graph G(G). A consequence of (2.22) is the
following.
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Lemma 1. Let G be a K 0 × N 0 matrix, where αr and αc are the maximum Hamming
weights of the rows and columns in G, respectively. Then the chromatic number of
the corresponding dependency graph G(G) is upper bounded as
X (G) ≤ min{N, αc (αr − 1) + 1}.

(2.23)

Proof. According to Definition 6, we have the upper bound ∆(G) ≤ αc (αr − 1) and
hence (2.23) follows directly from (2.22).

2.4.3

Large Deviation Upper Bound

In this subsection, we derive an upper bound on the frame unavailability probability.
The bound is based on the large deviation result in [50] for the tail probabilities of
P
rvs X = M
i=1 Xi , where the rvs Xi are generally dependent. We refer to this bound
as the large deviation bound (LDB). The correlation of rvs {Xi } is described in [50]
by a dependency graph. This is defined as any graph G(X) with Xi as vertices,
such that, if a vertex i ∈ {1, . . . , M }\{i} is not connected to any vertex in a subset
J ⊂ {1, . . . , M }, then Xi is independent of {Xj }j∈J .
Lemma 2 ([50]). Let X =

PM

i=1

Xi , where Xi ∼ Bern(pi ) and pi ∈ (0, 1) are generally

dependent. For any b ≥ 0, such that the inequality Xi − E(Xi ) ≥ −b holds for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , M } with probability one, and for any τ ≥ 0 we have




S
4bτ
Pr[X ≤ E(X) − τ ] ≤ exp − 2
ϕ
,
b X (G(X))
5S
∆

where S =

PN

i=1

(2.24)

∆

Var(Xi ) and ϕ(x) = (1 + x) ln(1 + x) − x. The same bound (2.24)

holds for Pr(X ≥ E(X) + τ ), where Xi − E(Xi ) ≤ b with probability one.
The following theorem uses Lemma 2 to derive a bound on the frame
unavailability probability.
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N
Theorem 3. Let Pmin
n,k = mini {Pn,k (γi )}i=1 . For all

t≥F

−1

N − dmin
P
N− N
i=1 Pn,k (γi )

!
,

(2.25)

the frame unavailability probability is upper bounded by

 


PN
4b(t)
N
F
(t)
−
F
(t)
P
(γ
)
−
N
+
d
n,k
i
min
i=1
S(t)
 ,
Pu (t) ≤ exp − 2
ϕ
b (t)X (Gc )
5S(t)
(2.26)

∆
where b(t) = F (t) 1 − Pmin
and
n,k
∆

S(t) =

N
X

F (t) (1 − Pn,k (γi )) (1 − F (t)(1 − Pn,k (γi ))) .

(2.27)

i=1

The upper bound (2.26) on the frame unavailability probability captures the dependency
of the frame unavailability probability on both the channel and the network function
virtualization code. In particular, the bound is an increasing function of the error
probabilities Pn,k (γi ), which depend on both codes. It also depends on the network
function virtualization code through parameters dmin and X (Gc ).
∆

Proof. Let Xi (t) = Ci (t)Di and X(t) =

PN

i=1

Xi (t), where Xi (t) are dependent

Bernoulli rvs with probability E[Xi (t)] = Pr[Xi (t) = 1] = F (t) (1 − Pn,k (γi )). It can
be seen that a valid dependency graph G(X) for the variables {Xi } is the dependency
graph G(Gc ) defined above. This is due to the fact that, as discussed in Section 2.4.3,
the rvs Xi and Xj are dependent if and only if the ith and jth column of Gc have
at least a 1 in a common row. We can hence apply Lemma 2 for every time t by
selecting τ = E(X) − N + dmin , and b(t) as defined above. Note that this choice of
b(t) meets the constraint for b in Lemma 2. For 1/µ1 = 0, (2.25) can be simplified as
follows:
t≥n a−

1
ln
µ

!!
P
dmin − N
P
(γ
)
n,k i
.
PNi=1
N − i=1 Pn,k (γi )
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(2.28)

Remark 1. When t → ∞, we have the limit limt→∞ F (t) = 1, which implies
that eventually all servers complete decoding.
∆

γ = Qd

max

∆

Letting dmax = max{di }N
i=1 and

(1, 2), the first row and second column’s entry of the matrix Qd

max

, the

bound (2.26) reduces to
−N Pn,k (γ)
4 (dmin /N − Pn,k (γ))
ϕ
(1 − Pn,k (γ))X (Gc )
5Pn,k (γ)

lim Pu (t) ≤ exp

t→∞

!!
.

(2.29)

This expression demonstrates the dependence of the frame unavailability probability
bound (2.26) on the number of servers N , the decoding error probability Pn,k (γ) for
each server, the chromatic number X (Gc ), and minimum distance dmin of the network
function virtualization code. In particular, it can be seen that the frame unavailability
probability upper bound (2.29) is a decreasing function of dmin , while it increases with
the chromatic number, Pn,k (γ) and with dmax .

2.4.4

Union Bound

As indicated in Theorem 3, the large deviation based bound in (2.30) is only valid
for large enough t, as can be observed from (2.28). Furthermore, it may generally
not be tight, since it neglects the independence of the indicator variables Ci . In this
subsection, a generally tighter but more complex union bound (UB) is derived that
is valid for all times t.
Theorem 4. For any subset A ⊆ {1, . . . , N }, define
min(A) ∆

Pn,k

∆

= min{Pn,k (γi )}i∈A and PA
n,k =

X
i∈A

25

Pn,k (γi ),

and let GA be the K × |A|, submatrix of Gc , with column indices in the subset A.
Then, the frame unavailability probability Pu (t) is upper bounded by
1−

N
X

1

X


al (t)
N
l l=N −dmin +1
A⊆{1,...,N }:
|A|=l

4bA l − N + dmin − PA
SA
n,k
1 −exp − 2
ϕ
bA X (GA )
5SA

!!!
.

(2.30)

where SA ,

∆

P

i∈A

min(A)

Pn,k (γi ) (1 − Pn,k (γi )) and bA = 1 − Pn,k

.

Proof. Let Ii = 1 − Di be the indicator variable which equals 1 if Server i fails
decoding. Accordingly, we have Ii ∼ Bern(Pn,k (γi )). For each subset A ⊆ {1, . . . , N },
P
let IA = i∈A Ii . The complement of the frame unavailability probability Ps (t) =
1 − Pu (t) can hence be written as
" N
#
X
Ps (t) =Pr
Ci (t)Di > N − dmin

(2.31)

i=1

=

1

N
l

=

N
X

1

N
l

al (t)

l=N −dmin +1
N
X

al (t)

X

·

l
X

Pr

hj

servers from A decode successfully
and
l−j servers from A fail to decode

i

A⊆{1,...,N }: j=N −dmin +1
|A|=l

X

(1−Pr[IA ≥ l−N +dmin]).

(2.32)

l=N−dmin+1 A⊆{1,...,N }:
|A|=l

We can now apply Lemma 2 to the probability in (2.32) by noting that G(GA ) is a
valid dependency graph for the variables {Ii }, i ∈ A. In particular, we apply Lemma
P
2 by setting τA = l − N + dmin − E(IA ), bA ≥ Ii − E[Ii ], and SA = i∈A Var (Ii ),
leading to
SA
Pr [IA ≥ l − N + dmin ] ≤ exp − 2
ϕ
bA X (GA )

4bA l − N + dmin − PA
n,k
5SA

 !!
.
(2.33)

By substituting (2.33) into (2.32), the proof is completed.
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Figure 2.4 In the model studied in Section 2.5, frames arrive at the receiver according
to a Poisson process with parameter λ. Server 0 in the cloud encodes the received frames
using an network function virtualization code and forwards the encoded packets to servers
1, . . . , N for decoding.

2.5

Random Arrivals and Queuing

In this section, we extend our analysis from one to multiple frames transmitted by
the users. To this end, we study the system illustrated in Figure 2.4 with random
frame arrival times and queueing at the servers. We specifically focus on the analysis
of the trade-off between average latency and FER.

2.5.1

System Model

As illustrated in Figure 2.4, we assume that the arrival times of the received frames
are random and distributed according to a Poisson process with a rate of λ frames
per second. Upon arrival, Server 0 applies an network function virtualization code
to any received frame yr for r = 1, 2, . . ., as described in Section II and sends each
resulting coded packet ỹri to Server i, for i = 1, . . . , N . At Server i, each packet ỹri
enters a first-come-first-serve queue. After arriving at the head of the queue, each
packet ỹri requires a random time Ti to be decoded by Server i. Here, we assume that
Ti is distributed according to an exponential distribution in (2.16) with an average
processing time of 1/µ2 per bit. Furthermore, the average time to process a frame of
n bits is denoted as 1/µ. Also, the random variables Ti are i.i.d. across servers.
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If the network function virtualization code has minimum distance dmin , as soon
as N −dmin +1 servers decode successfully their respective packets derived from frame
yr , the information frame ur can be decoded at Server 0. We denote as T the average
overall latency for decoding frame ur , which includes both queuing and processing.
Using (2.19), (2.20) and the fact that all servers complete decoding almost surely
as t → ∞, that is Ci (t) → 1 as t → ∞, the FER is equal to
" N
#
X
Pe = Pr
Ii ≥ dmin ,

(2.34)

i=1

where Ii is the indicator variable that equals 1 if decoding at Server i fails. This
probability can be upper bounded by the following corollary of Theorem 3.
Corollary 3. The FER defined in (2.34) is upper bounded by


 
PN
P
(γ
)
4b
d
−
min
i=1 n,k i
−S
 ,
Pe ≤ exp 2
ϕ
b X (GC )
5S
∆

where S =

PN

i=1

(2.35)

∆

Pn,k (γi ) (1 − Pn,k (γi )) and b = 1 − Pmin
n,k .

Proof. The result follows from Theorem 3 by selecting τ = dmin −

PN

i=1

Pn,k (γi ).

We now discuss the computation of the average delay T for different queueing
management policies.

2.5.2

Per-Frame Decoding

We first study the system under a queue management policy whereby only one frame
yr is decoded at any time. Therefore, all servers wait until at least N − dmin + 1
servers have completed decoding of their respective packets ỹri before moving to the
next frame r + 1, if this is currently available in the queues. Furthermore, as soon as
Server 0 decodes a frame, the corresponding packets still being present in the servers’
queues are evicted.
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Figure 2.5

Decoding latency versus frame unavailability probability (FUP) for L =
504, N = 8, 1/µ1 = 0, µ2 = 10, a = 1, δ = 0.01, r = 0.5) : (a) LDB, UB and Exact frame
unavailability probability for the parallel, single-server, and repetition coding.

As a result, the overall system can be described an M/G/1 queue with arrival
time λ and service time distributed according to the (N − dmin + 1)th order statistic
of the exponential distribution [54]. The latter has the pdf [89]
fTN −dmin +1:N (t) =

N!
fT (t)FT (t)N −dmin (1 − FT (t))dmin −1 ,
(N − dmin )!(dmin − l)!

(2.36)

where FT (t) and fT (t) are the cdf and pdf of rv Ti , respectively. This queueing system
was also studied in the context of distributed storage systems.
Using the Pollaczek-Khinchin formula [103], the average delay Tpfd of an M/G/1
queue can be obtained as
λn2 [(HN − Hdmin −1 )2 + (HN 2 − H(dmin −1)2 )]
n(HN − Hdmin −1 )
+
,
(N − dmin + 1)µ
2(N − dmin + 1)2 µ2 [1 − λnµ−1 (N − dmin + 1)−1 (HN − Hdmin −1 )]
(2.37)
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Figure 2.6

Decoding latency versus frame unavailability probability (FUP) for L =
504, N = 8, 1/µ1 = 0, µ2 = 10, a = 1, δ = 0.01, r = 0.5) : LDB, UB and Monte Carlo
simulation (“MC Sim.”) results for split repetition code, SPC code, and the network
function virtualization code Cc defined in (2.21).

P 1
where HN and HN 2 are generalized harmonic numbers, defined by HN = N
i=1 i and
P
1
HN 2 = N
i=1 i2 [54]. Note that the queue is stable, and hence the average delay (2.37)
is finite, if the inequality nλ(HN − Hdmin −1 ) < µ(N − dmin + 1) holds. We refer to
the described queue management scheme as per-frame decoding (pfd). This set-up is
equivalent to the fork-join system studied in [54].

2.5.3

Continuous Decoding

As an alternative queue management policy, as soon as any Server i decodes its packet
ỹri , it starts decoding the next packet ỹr+1
in its queue, if this is currently available.
i
Furthermore, as above, as soon as Server 0 decodes a frame yr , all corresponding
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packets ỹri still in the servers’ queues are evicted. We refer this queue management
policy as continuous decoding (cd).
The average delay in Equation (2.37) of per-frame decoding is an upper bound
for the average delay of continuous decoding, i.e., we have Tcd ≤ Tpfd [54]. This is
because, with per-frame decoding, all N servers are blocked until N − dmin + 1 servers
decode their designed packets. We evaluate the performance of continuous decoding
using Monte Carlo methods in the next section.

2.6

Simulation Results

In this section, we provide numerical results to provide additional insights into the
performance trade-off for the system shown in Figure 2.1. We first consider individual
frame transmission as studied in Section 3.2 and Section 2.4, and then we study
random arrivals as investigated in Section 2.5.

2.6.1

Single Frame Transmission

We first consider single frame transmission. The main goals are to validate the
usefulness of the two bounds presented in Theorems 1 and 2 as design tools and
to assess the importance of coding in obtaining desirable trade-offs between decoding
latency and frame unavailability probability. We employ a frame length of L = 504
and N = 8 servers.

The user code Cu is selected to be a randomly designed

(3, 6) regular (Gallager-type) LDPC code with r = 0.5, which is decoded via belief
propagation.
We compare the performance of the following solutions: (i ) Standard singleserver decoding, whereby we assume, as a benchmark, the use of a single server, that
is N = 1, that decodes the entire frame (K = 1); (ii ) Repetition coding, whereby the
entire frame (K = 1) is replicated at all servers; (iii ) Parallel processingor uncoded,
whereby the frame is divided into K = N disjoint parts processed by different servers;
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(iv ) Split repetition coding, whereby the frame is split into two parts, which are each
replicated at N/2 servers. The code has hence K = 2, dmin = N/2, X (Gc ) = N/2,
which can be thought of as an intermediate choice between repetition coding and the
parallel scheme; (v ) Single parity check code (SPC), with N = K + 1, whereby, in
addition to the servers used by parallel decoding, an additional server decodes the
binary sum of all other K received packets; and (vi ) a network function virtualization
code Cc with the generator matrix Gc defined in (2.21), which is characterized by
K = 4. Note that, with both single-server decoding and repetition coding, we have
a blocklength of n = 1008 for the channel code. Single-server decoding is trivially
characterized by X (Gc ) = dmin = 1, while repetition coding is such that the equalities
X (Gc ) = dmin = 8 hold. Furthermore, the parallel approach is characterized by
n = 126, dmin = 1 and X (Gc ) = 1; the split repetition code is characterized by
n = 504, dmin = 4 and X (Gc ) = 4; the SPC code has n = 144, dmin = 2 and
X (Gc ) = 2; and the network function virtualization code Cc has n = 252, dmin = 3
and X (Gc ) = 3. The exact frame unavailability probability for a given function Pn,k (·)
can easily be computed for cases (i )-(iii ). In particular, for single server decoding,
the frame unavailability probability equals
Pu (t) = 1 − a1 (t)(1 − PL/r,L (δ));

(2.38)

for the repetition code, the frame unavailability probability is
Pu (t) = 1 −

N
X

ai (t)(1 − PL/r,L (δ));

(2.39)

i=1

and for the parallel approach, we have
Pu (t) = 1 − aN (t)(1 − PL/(rN ),L/N (δ))N .
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Figure 2.7 Parallel, single server and repetition code.
In contrast, the exact frame unavailability probabilities for the SPC and code Cc are
difficult to compute, due to the discussed correlation among the decoding outcomes
at the servers.
Figure 2.5 shows decoding latency versus frame unavailability probability for
the LDB in Theorem 3, the UB in Theorem 4, and the exact error (2.38), (2.39),
(2.40), for the first three schemes (i )-(iii ), and Figure 2.6 shows the LDB in Theorem
3, the UB in Theorem 4, as well as Monte Carlo simulation results for schemes (iv ),
(v ), and (vi ). Here, we assume that the latency contribution that, is independent
of the workload, is negligible, i.e., 1/µ1 = 0. We also set a = 1 and µ2 = 10. As a
first observation, Figures 2.7 and 2.8 confirms that the UB bound is tighter than the
LDB.
Leveraging multiple servers in parallel for decoding is seen to yield significant
gains in terms of the trade-off between latency and frame unavailability probability
33

10 0

10 -1

10 -2

10 -3

10 -4

10 -5

10 -6

LDB
UB
MC Sim.
0

200

400

600

800

Figure 2.8 Decoding latency versus frame unavailability probability (FUP) for (L =
504, N = 8, 1/µ1 = 50, µ2 = 20, a = 0.1, δ = 0.01, r = 0.5) : (a) LDB, UB and Exact frame
unavailability probability for the parallel, single-server, and repetition coding; (b) LDB, UB
and Monte Carlo simulation (“MC Sim.”) results for split repetition code, SPC code, and
the network function virtualization code Cc defined in (2.21). Split repetition code, SPC
code and Cc code.
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as argued also in [87] by using experimental results. In particular, the parallel scheme
is observed to be preferred for lower latencies. This is due to the shorter blocklength
n, which entails a smaller average decoding latency. However, the error floor of the
parallel scheme is large due to the higher error probability for short blocklengths. In
this case, other forms of network function virtualization coding are beneficial. To
elaborate, repetition coding requires a larger latency in order to obtain acceptable
frame unavailability probability performance owing to the larger blocklength n, but
it achieves a significantly lower error floor. For intermediate latencies, the SPC
code, and at larger latencies also both the network function virtualization code
Cc , and the split repetition code provide a lower frame unavailability probability.
This demonstrates the effectiveness of network function virtualization encoding in
obtaining a desirable trade-off between latency and frame unavailability probability.
In order to validate the conclusion obtained using the bounds, Figures 2.7 and
2.8 also shows the exact frame unavailability probability for the schemes (i )-(iii ), as
well as Monte Carlo simulation results for schemes (iv )-(vi ), respectively. While the
absolute numerical values of the bounds in Figures 2.5 and 2.6 are not uniformly tight
with respect to the actual performance, the relative performance of the coding schemes
are well matched by the analytical bounds. This provides evidence of the usefulness
of the derived bounds as a tool for code design in network function virtualization
systems.
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 are obtained in the same way as Figures 2.5 and 2.6, except
for the parameters µ1 = 0.02, µ2 = 20, and a = 0.1. Unlike Figures 2.5 and 2.6, here
latency may be dominated by effects that are independent of the blocklength n since
we have 1/µ1 > 0. The key difference with respect to Figures 2.7 and 2.8 is that,
for this choice of parameters, repetition coding tends to outperform both the parallel
case, and the network function virtualization code Cc , apart from very small latencies.
This is because repetition coding has the maximum resilience to the unavailability of
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Figure 2.9 Decoding latency versus exact frame unavailability probability (FUP) for
parallel and repetition coding for different number of servers N ∈ {3, 6, 12} and (L =
240, 1/µ1 = 0, µ2 = 10, a = 1, δ = 0.03, r = 0.5)

the servers, while not being excessively penalized by the larger blocklength n. This
is not the case, however, for very small latency levels, where the network function
virtualization code Cc provides the smallest frame unavailability probability given its
shorter blocklength as compared to repetition coding and its larger dmin , with respect
to the parallel scheme.
Figure 2.9 shows the exact frame unavailability probability for the extreme cases
of parallel and repetition coding for different number of servers N ∈ {3, 6, 12}. The
figure confirms that, for both schemes, the latency decreases for a larger number of
servers N . However, by increasing N , the error floor of the parallel scheme grows due
to the higher channel error probability for shorter block lengths.
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Figure 2.10 Average latency versus FER with different values of the user code rate r
and for different coding schemes when the system is lightly loaded, with L = 112, N =
8, δ = 0.03, λ = 0.1, µ = 500.

2.6.2

Random Frame Transmission

We now consider the queueing system described in Section 2.5, and present numerical
results that provide insights into the performance of both per-frame and continuous
decoding in terms of FER versus average latency (2.34). As above, the decoding error
probability is upper bounded by using [83, Theorem 33]. Both FER and average
latency are a function of the user code rate r. We hence vary r ∈ {1/2, . . . , 1/5} to
parametrize a trade-off curve between FER and latency. We assume a frame length of
L = 112 bits with N = 8 servers, and adopt the same user code Cc as in the previous
subsection. The average delay Tpfd is computed from (2.37), and Tcd is obtained via
Monte Carlo simulations.

37

10 0
Per-frame decoding
Continuous decoding

10 -2

10 -4

10 -6

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

Figure 2.11 Average latency versus FER with different values of the user code rate r
and for different coding schemes when the system is heavily loaded, with L = 112, N =
8, δ = 0.03, λ = 1, µ = 50.
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Figures 2.10 and 2.11 compare the performance of repetition coding, the network
function virtualization code Cc with the generator matrix (2.21), and the parallel
approach as defined above. Figure 2.10 considers a lightly loaded system with λ = 0.1
frames per second and µ = 500 frames per second, while Figure 2.11 shows a highly
loaded system with both λ = 1 frames per second and µ = 50 frames per second.
First, by comparing the two figures we observe that per-frame decoding and
continuous decoding have a similar performance when the system is lightly loaded
(see Figure 2.10), while continuous decoding yields a smaller average latency than
per-frame decoding when the system is heavily loaded (see Figure 2.11). This is
because, in the former case, it is likely that a frame is decoded successfully before the
next one arrives. This is in contrast to heavily loaded systems in which the average
latency becomes dominated by queuing delays. We also note that, for repetition
coding, the performance of per-frame decoding and continuous decoding coincides in
both lightly or heavily loaded systems, since decoding is complete as soon as one
server decodes successfully.
Also, by comparing the performance of different codes, we recover some of
the main insights obtained from the study of the isolated frame transmission. In
particular, the parallel approach outperforms all other schemes for low average delays
due to its shorter block length n. In contrast, repetition coding outperforms all
other schemes in FER for large average delay because of its large block length n and
consequently low probability of decoding error (not shown). Furthermore, we observe
that split repetition coding is to be preferred for small values of FER.
Finally, Figure 2.12 demonstrates the behavior of the average latency as the
arrival rate λ increases and the system becomes more heavily loaded. We observe
that, for a lightly loaded system, the latencies of per frame and continuous decoding
are similar, while continuous decoding is preferable for a large number of λ. This is
because per-frame decoding requires all servers to wait until at least N − dmin + 1
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Figure 2.12 Average latency versus arrival rate λ (L = 112, N = 8, r = 0.5, µ = 500).
servers have completed decoding of their respective packets before moving on to the
next frame.

2.7

Discussion and Concluding Remarks

We obtained the performance of a novel coded NFV approach for the uplink of a
C-RAN system in which decoding takes place at a multi-server or multi-core cloud
processor. This approach is based on the linear combination of the received packets
prior to their distribution to the servers or cores, and on the exploitation of the
algebraic properties of linear channel codes. The method can be thought of as an
application of the emerging principle of coded computing to NFV. Analysis and
simulation results demonstrate the significant gains that linear coding of received
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packets, or NFV coding, can yield in terms of trade-off between decoding latency and
FER. Among interesting open problems, we mention here the design of optimal NFV
codes and the extension of the principle of NFV coding to Gaussian channels.
The source of the error probability in the system is due to first, decoding noisy
packets in servers and second a random respond time that each server needs to decode.
Furthermore, we explore the tradeoff between effective parameters of the NFV system
such as minimum distance and chromatic number of the code. These analysis direct us
to interesting future design of NFV codes considering the application of the principle
of coded NFV.
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CHAPTER 3
PRIVATE AND SECURE MATRIX MULTIPLICATION WITH
FLEXIBLE COMMUNICATION LOAD

3.1
3.1.1

Introduction

Motivation and Problem Definition

At the core of many signal processing and machine learning applications are tensor
operations, most notably large matrix multiplications [51].

In the presence of

practically sized data sets, such operations are typically carried out using distributed
computing platforms with a master server and multiple workers that can operate in
parallel over distinct parts of the data set. The master server plays the role of the
parameter server, distributing data to the workers and periodically reconciling their
internal state [69]. Workers are commercial off-the-shelf servers that are characterized
by possible temporary failures and delays [28].
Straggling workers can affect the computation latency by orders of magnitude,
e.g., [55, 106]. While current distributed computing platforms conventionally handle
straggling servers by means of replication of computing tasks [49], recent work has
shown that encoding the input data can help reduce the computation latency. More
generally, coding is able to control the trade-off between computational delay and
communication load between workers and master server [66, 111, 74, 6, 7, 37, 35,
39, 38, 98]. Furthermore, stochastic coding can help keeping both input and output
data secure from the workers, assuming that the latter are honest, i.e., carrying out
the prescribed protocol, but curious [81, 113, 22, 56, 107, 32, 27, 80]. This chapter
contributes to this line of work by investigating the trade-off between computational
delay and communication load as a function of the privacy level.
As illustrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, we focus on the basic problem of computing
a matrix multiplication C = AB in a distributed computing system of P workers that
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can process each only a fraction 1/m and 1/n of matrices A and B, respectively. In
the first setup under study, illustrated in Figure 3.1, both matrices A and B are to
be kept private from the workers. Here, three performance criteria are of interest:

• the recovery threshold PR , that is, the number of workers that need to complete
their task before the master server can recover the product C;
• the communication load CL between workers and master server, i.e., the amount
of information to be downloaded from the workers;
• the maximum number PC of colluding servers that ensures perfect secrecy for
both data matrices A and B.
In the second setup of interest shown in Figure 3.2, only matrix A is private,
while matrix B is selected from a public data set B. In this case, apart from the
security constraint on A, we only impose a privacy constraint on the identity of
the specific matrix B ∈ B of interest.

As a motivation for this second setup,

consider a recommender system based on collaborative filtering [85]. In this case,
recommendations are based on the product of two matrices, one describing the profile
of a user, or a group of users, and one representing features of the items of interest,
such as movies, music or TV shows. The users’ profile matrix can be modelled by
the private matrix A. Hence ensuring the privacy of users’ data; while the items’
data matrix for each category is represented by one of the matrices in the public data
set B = {B(k) }Lk=1 . This latter assumption captures the constraint that users may
want to keep the confidential types of items they are interested in. For this problem,
the criteria of interest are still PR and PC , and we simplify the problem by setting
PC = 1. This chapter focuses on the design of coding and computing techniques for
both problems.

3.1.2

Related Work

In order to put our contribution in perspective, we briefly review prior related work.
Consider first solutions that provide no security guarantees, i.e., PC = 0, for the
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problem in Figure 3.1. As a direct extension of [66], a first approach is to use
product codes that apply separately the maximum distance separable (MDS) codes
to encode the two matrices [68]. The recovery threshold of this scheme is improved
by [111], which introduces polynomial codes. The construction in [111] is proved to
be optimal under the assumption that minimal communication is allowed between
workers and master server. MatDot codes are introduced in [39], resulting in a lower
recovery threshold at the expense of a larger communication load. The construction
in [37] bridges the gap between polynomial and MatDot codes and presents PolyDot
codes, yielding a trade-off between recovery threshold and communication load. An
extension of this scheme, termed Generalized PolyDot (GPD) codes improves on the
recovery threshold of PolyDot codes [35], which is independently obtained also by the
construction in [112]. GPD codes in [35] are used to design a unified coded computing
strategy for the training of deep neural networks.
Much less work has been done in the literature for the case in which security
constraints are factored in, i.e., where PC 6= 0, for the problem of Figure 3.1. In
[113], Lagrange coding is presented that achieves the minimum recovery threshold
for multilinear functions by generalizing MatDot codes. In [81, 80], coded schemes
have been used to develop multi-party computation techniques to calculate arbitrary
polynomials of massive matrices, preserving the security of the data matrices.
In [22, 56, 32] a reduction of the communication load is obtained by extending
polynomial codes. While these works focus on either minimizing recovery threshold
or communication load, the trade-off between these two fundamental quantities has
not been addressed in the open literature to the best of our knowledge. A new class
of secure distributed matrix multiplication and its capacity is studied in [53].
In the second part of this work, we study a connection between secure matrix
multiplication and private information retrieval (PIR), as illustrated in Figure 3.2.
The private information retrieval problem was introduced in [26] and has been widely
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studied in recent years, e.g., in [43, 110, 99, 14, 41, 59, 58, 61, 23, 100]. In [61]
and [23] the private information retrieval setup was investigated for the problem
of distributed matrix multiplication illustrated in Figure 3.2 that imposes private
information retrieval guarantees for the index of matrix B within a public library.
In [61], a coding strategy is proposed that combines the private information retrieval
scheme for non-colluding servers (i.e., with PC = 1) [26] with polynomial codes [111].
In [23], the authors introduce a related approach for this problem, and show that it
outperforms the scheme proposed in [61] in terms of upload and download cost. The
code design in [23] focuses on the minimization of the communication load, and does
not explore the trade-off between this metric and the recovery threshold.

3.1.3

Main Contribution

In this dissertation, we first present a novel class of secure computation codes, referred
to as secure GPD (SGPD) codes, for the setup in Figure 3.1, SGPD codes generalize
GPD codes to operate at a flexible communication load level. This yields a new
achievable trade-off between recovery threshold PR and communication load CL as
a function of a prescribed number of colluding workers PC . In the process, we also
introduce a novel perspective on distributed computing codes based on the signal
processing concepts of convolution and z-transform. SGPD codes. Then, SGPD codes
are modified to offer a solution, introduced here for the first time, for the scenario in
Figure 3.2. This is done through concatenation with the private information retrieval
code in [61], which ensures both secrecy of the input matrix A and privacy of the
identity for the desired matrix in the library B if PC = 1. The resulting codes
are referred to as private and secure GPD (PSGPD) codes. They generalize the
approach in [23], enabling a trade-off between (upload) communication load and
recovery threshold. We finally illustrate the benefits of the proposed codes, which offer
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a flexible trade-off between communication load and recovery threshold, by analyzing
the overall completion time due to both computation and communication.

3.1.4

Organization

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we present the system
models for secure matrix multiplication (Figure 3.1 in Section 3.2.3) and for private
and secure matrix multiplication (Figure 3.2 in Section 3.2.4), respectively. In Section
3.3, we propose an intuitive interpretation of the GPD code introduced in [39]. Using
z-transforms, Section 3.4 proposes a novel extension of GPD codes by imposing
a security constraint on the data matrices and deriving the resulting trade-off
between recovery threshold PR and communication load CL . In this section, we also
study overall completion latency encompassing both computation and communication
latencies for SGPD codes. In Section 3.5, we address the setup in Figure 3.2, again
with respect to the trade-off between PR and CL and to the overall completion latency.
This chapter is concluded in Section 3.6.

3.2
3.2.1

Problem Statement

Notation

Throughout this chapter, we denote a matrix with upper boldface letters (e.g., X),
and lower boldface letters indicate a vector or a sequence of matrices (e.g., x).
Furthermore, a math calligraphic font refers to a set (e.g., X ). A set F represents
the Galois field with cardinality |F|. We denote by N the set of all non-zero positive
∆

integers, and for some a, b ∈ N, a ≤ b, [a, b] = {a, a + 1, . . . , b}. For any real number
r, dre represents the largest integer nearest to r. The function H(·) represents the
entropy of its argument, and I(X; Y ) denotes the mutual information of the random
variables X and Y .
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Figure 3.1

Secure matrix multiplication: the master server encodes both input matrices
A and B, to be kept secure from the workers, and both random matrices R and R0 ,
respectively, to define the computational tasks of the slave servers or workers. The workers
may fail or straggle, and they are honest but curious, with colluding subsets of workers of
size at most PC . The master server must be able to decode the product C = AB from the
output of a subset of PR servers, which defines the recovery threshold.

3.2.2

System Model

As illustrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, we consider a distributed computing system
with a master server and P slave servers or workers. The master server is interested
in computing securely the matrix product C = AB of two data matrices A and B
with dimensions T × S and S × D, respectively. The matrices have i.i.d. uniformly
distributed entries from a sufficient large finite field F, with |F| > P . More precisely,
we will consider two scenarios. In the first, both matrices A and B are available
at the master server and contain confidential data that should be kept secure from
the workers (see Figure 3.1). In the second, only matrix A contains confidential
information, and there are L public matrices in the set B = {B(r) }Lr=1 from which
the master node wishes to compute the product C(κ) = AB(κ) for some κth index
κ ∈ [1, L]. The index must be kept private against the workers (see Figure 3.2). In
the subsequent sections, we first describe the system model for the setup in Figure
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3.1, referred to as secure matrix multiplication, followed by the setup for the model
in Figure 3.2, referred to as private and secure matrix multiplication.

3.2.3

Secure Matrix Multiplication

For the scenario in Figure 3.1 workers receive information on matrices A ∈ FT ×S and
B ∈ FS×D from the master server; they process this information and they respond
to the master server, which finally recovers the product C = AB with minimal
computational effort. Due to communication and complexity constraints, each worker
can receive only T S/m and SD/n symbols, respectively, for some integers m and n.
The workers are honest but curious. Accordingly, we impose the secrecy constraint
that, even if up to PC < P workers collude, the workers cannot obtain any information
about both matrices A and B based on the data received from the master server.
To keep the data secure and to leverage possible computational redundancy
at the workers (namely, if P/m > 1 and/or P/n > 1), the master server sends
encoded versions of the input matrices to the workers due to the above mentioned
communication and complexity constraints. Specifically, it produces the encoded
matrices Ap = fp (A, R), where R is a random matrix of dimension T 0 × S 0 , for some
integers T 0 and S 0 to be defined below, via the function
fp : FT ×S × FT

0 ×S 0

→ FT /t×S/s ,

(3.1)

for some integers t and s such that m = st. The resulting T S/m entries in the
output of function fp are then sent to worker p, with p ∈ [1, P ]. Likewise, the master
server computes the encoded matrices Bp = gp (B, R0 ), where R0 is a random matrix
of dimension S 0 × D0 , for some integers S 0 and D0 to be defined below, using the
function
0

0

gp : FS×D × FS ×D → FS/s×D/d ,
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(3.2)

for some integers s and d such that n = sd. The resulting SD/n entries in Bp are
then sent to worker p. The random matrices R and R0 consists of i.i.d. uniformly
distributed entries from a field F. The security constraint imposes the condition
I(AP , BP ; A, B) = 0,

(3.3)

for all subsets of P ⊂ [1, P ] of PC workers, where the random matrices R and R0
serve as random keys in order to meet the security constraint (3.3) [94].
Each worker p computes the product Cp = Ap Bp of the encoded sub-matrices
Ap and Bp . The master server collects a subset of PR ≤ P outputs from the workers as
defined by the subset {Cp }p∈PR with |PR | = PR . It then applies a decoding function
as h ({Cp }p∈PR ),
h : |FT /t×D/d × ·{z
· · × FT /t×D/d} → FT ×D .

(3.4)

PR times

Note that correct decoding translates into the condition
H(AB|{Cp }p∈PR ) = 0.

(3.5)

A coding and decoding strategy that satisfies condition (3.3) and (3.5) is said to be
feasible.
For given parameters m and n the performance of a coding and decoding scheme
is measured by the triple (PC , PR , CL ), where CL is defined as
CL =

X

|Cp |;

(3.6)

p∈PR

|Cp | is the dimension of the product matrix Cp computed by worker p. Note that
∆

condition (3.5) requires the inequality min{PR /m, PR /n} ≥ 1 or PR ≥ PR,min =
max{m, n}, which is hence a lower bound for the minimum recovery threshold.
∆

Furthermore, the communication load is lower bounded by CL ≥ CL,min = T D,
which is the size of the product C = AB.
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Figure 3.2

Private and secure matrix multiplication: the master server encodes the
(κ)
input matrix A, to be kept secret from the workers, and generates the encoded matrix Ap
(κ)
for each worker p. It also sends a query qp as a function of the index κ ∈ [1, L], to be
kept private from workers, of the desired product C(κ) = AB(κ) , with matrices {B(r) }L
r=1
available at all workers. The non-colluding workers may fail or straggle, and they are honest
but curious. The master server must be able to decode the product C(κ) from the output
of a subset of PR servers, which defines the recovery threshold.

3.2.4

Private and Secure Matrix Multiplication

In this subsection, we discuss the private and secure matrix multiplication problem
illustrated in Figure 3.2. In this setup, the master server wishes to compute the
product C(κ) = AB(κ) of a confidential input matrix A with a matrix B(κ) from a set
of public matrices {B(1) , . . . , B(L) }, while keeping the index κ of the matrix B(κ) of
interest private from the workers.
Similar to the secure model in Figure 3.1, we consider a distributed computing
system with a master server and P honest but curious workers. The master server
contains a confidential data matrix A with dimension T × S. Each worker has access
to the library B, which consists of L distinct matrices {B(1) , . . . , B(L) }, each with
dimension S × D. As above, all matrices contain data symbols chosen uniformly i.i.d.
from a sufficient large finite field F, with |F| > P . The master server is interested in
computing the matrix product C(κ) = AB(κ) of the data matrix A and of a matrix
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B(κ) for some index κ ∈ [1, L]. This should be done while keeping the data matrix
A secret against the workers in the same sense as in the scenario of Figure 3.1, while
also ensuring that the index κ is kept secret from the workers.
To do so, as in the private information retrieval problem [99, 14], the master
(κ)

(κ)

server generates P query vectors q1 , . . . , qP ∈ FL , for some L > 1 as a function
(κ)

of the desired index κ and sends each worker p ∈ [1, P ], the query vector qp . We
assume that the workers do not collude, i.e., we set PC = 1. Extensions to any PC > 1
are possible and are left for future work. We note that, when the input matrix A is
an identity matrix, the setup reduces to a private information retrieval problem.
To keep the data matrix A secure against workers, the master server sends each
(κ)

worker p ∈ [1, P ] an encoded version Ap = fp (κ, A, R) ∈ FT /t×S/s which is a function
(κ)

of index κ, and through it, of the query qp , of the data matrix A and of a random
matrix R, for some integers t and s such that m = ts.
(κ)

(κ)

(κ)

Upon receiving (qp , Ap ), each worker p uses the query qp
(κ)

S/s × D/d matrix Bp

to derive an

(κ)

= gp (qp , B) ∈ FS/s×D/d from the library B by using an

encoding function
S×D
gp : FL × F
× ·{z
· · × FS×D} → FS/s×D/d ,
|

(3.7)

L times

for some integers s and d such that n = sd. We emphasize that, unlike the setup
considered in Figure 3.1, the content of the desired matrix B(κ) is not secure against
workers, since the library B is public. Each worker p then computes the product
(κ)

Cp

(κ)

(κ)

= A p Bp

and sends it to the master server. The master server collects a

(κ)

subset {Cp }p∈PR of PR ≤ P outputs from the workers with |PR | = PR . It then
(κ)

applies a decoding function h({Cp }p∈PR ), as in (3.4), in order to retrieve the desired
product C(κ) = AB(κ) .
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To guarantee the secrecy of input matrix A, in a manner similar to (3.3), we
have the constraint
(κ)
(κ)
I(A(κ)
p , Bp , qp , B; A) = 0,

(3.8)

for all p ∈ [1, P ]. Following the private information retrieval formulation on [61], in
order to ensure the privacy of index κ, for some value of κ the information available
at each worker should be statistically indistinguishable from that available for any
other value κ0 6= κ. Mathematically, for all κ, κ0 ∈ [1, L] with κ0 6= κ and for all
workers p ∈ [1, P ], we have the condition
0

0

0

(κ)
(κ)
(κ )
(κ )
(κ )
(q(κ)
p , Ap , Cp , B) ∼ (qp , Ap , Cp , B),

(κ0 )

(κ0 )

(3.9)

(κ0 )

that is, the joint distribution of variables (qp , Ap , Cp , B) should be the same for
any pair of index values κ0 6= κ. Finally, the correct decoding requirement is defined
as in (3.5), that is
H(AB(κ) |{C(κ)
p }p∈PR ) = 0.

(3.10)

A coding and decoding strategy that satisfies conditions (3.8), (3.9), and (3.10) is
said to be feasible. For given parameters m and n the performance is measured by
the pair (PR , CL ), with PC = 1, where CL is the communication load defined in (3.6).

3.3

Background: Generalized PolyDot Code without Security
Constraint

In this section, we consider the system model shown in Figure 3.1 and review the
GPD construction first proposed in [39] and later improved in [112, 35] for the special
case of no secrecy constrains, i.e., PC = 0. In the process, we propose a novel intuitive
interpretation of GPD encoding and decoding based on the distributed computation
of samples from convolutions via z-transforms.
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Figure 3.3 Construction of the time sequences a and b used to define the generalized
PolyDot (GPD) code. The zero dashed lines in b indicates all-zero block sequences. Each
solid arrows in a and b shows a distinct row of A and a column of B, respectively.

We start by recalling that the GPD coding scheme achieves the best currently
known trade-off between recovery threshold PR and communication load CL for PC =
0, i.e., under no security constraint. The entangled polynomial codes of [112] have
the same properties in terms of (PR , PC ). The GPD codes for PC = 0 also achieve
the optimal recovery threshold among all linear coding strategies in the cases of t = 1
or d = 1, also they minimize the recovery threshold for the minimum communication
load CL,min [111, 112].
The GPD code splits the data matrices A and B both horizontally and vertically
as


 A1,1 . . . A1,s
 .
..
...
.
A=
.
 .

At,1 . . . At,s






 B1,1 . . . B1,d


..
...
 , B =  ...
.




Bs,1 . . . Bs,d




.



(3.11)

The parameters s, t, and d can be set arbitrarily under the constraints m = ts and
n = sd. Note that polynomial codes set s = 1, while MatDot codes have t = d = 1
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[37]. All sub-matrices Ai,j and Bk,l have dimensions T /t × S/s and S/s × D/d,
respectively. The GPD code computes each block (i, j) of the product C = AB,
P
namely Ci,j = sk=1 Ai,k Bk,j , for i ∈ [1, t] and j ∈ [1, d], in a distributed fashion.
This is done by means of polynomial encoding and polynomial interpolation. As we
review next, the computation of block Ci,j can be interpreted as the evaluation of
the middle sample of the convolution ci,j = ai ∗ bj between the block sequences ai =
[Ai,1 , . . . , Ai,s ] and bj = [Bs,j , . . . , B1,j ]. In fact, the sth sample of the block sequence
ci,j equals Ci,j , i.e., [ci,j ]s = Ci,j . The computation is carried out distributively in
the frequency domain by using z-transforms with different workers being assigned
distinct samples in the frequency domain.
To elaborate, define the block sequence a obtained by concatenating the block
sequences ai as a = {a1 , a2 , . . . , at }. Pictorially, a sequence a is obtained from the
matrix A by reading the blocks in the left-to-right top-to-bottom order, as seen in
Figure 3.3. We also introduce the longer time block sequence b as
b = {b1 , 0, b2 , 0, . . . , bd },

(3.12)

with 0 being a block sequence of s(t∗ − 1) all-zero block matrices with dimensions
S/s × D/d. The sequence b can be obtained from the matrix B by following the
bottom-to-top left-to-right order shown in Figure 3.3 and by adding the all-zero block
sequences between any two columns of the matrix B.
In the frequency domain, the z-transforms of sequences a and b are obtained
as
Fa (z) =

ts−1
X

r

[a]r+1 z =

r=0

t X
s
X

(3.13)

i=1 j=1

s−1+ts(d−1)

Fb (z) =

Ai,j z s(i−1)+j−1 ,

X

r

[b]r+1 z =

r=0

s X
d
X
k=1 l=1
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Bk,l z s−k+ts(l−1) ,

(3.14)

respectively. The master server evaluates the polynomials Fa (z) and Fb (z) in P
non-zero distinct points z1 , . . . , zP ∈ F and sends the corresponding linearly encoded
matrices Ap = Fa (zp ) and Bp = Fb (zp ) to server p.

The encoding functions

are hence given by the polynomial evaluations (3.13) and (3.14), for z1 , . . . , zp .
Server p computes the multiplication Fa (zp )Fb (zp ) and sends it to the master
server. The master server computes the inverse z-transform for the received products
{Ap Bp }p∈PR = {Fa (zp )Fb (zp )}p∈PR , obtaining the convolution a ∗ b.
From the convolution a ∗ b, we can see that the master server is able to
compute all the desired blocks Ci,j by reading the middle samples of the convolutions
ci,j = ai ∗ bj from samples of the sequence c = a ∗ b in the order [c]s−1 =
C1,1 , [c]2s−1 = C2,1 , . . . , [c]ts−1 = Ct,1 , [c]s−1+t∗ s = C1,2 , . . . , [c]ts−1+t∗ s = Ct,2 , . . ..
Note that, in particular, the zero block subsequences added to sequence b ensure
that no interference from the other convolutions, ci0 ,j 0 affects the middle (sth) sample
of a convolution ci,j with i0 6= i and j 0 6= j.
To carry out the inverse transform, the master server needs to collect as many
values Fa (zp )Fb (zp ) as there are samples of the sequence a ∗ b, yielding the recovery
threshold
PR = tsd + s − 1.

(3.15)

Equivalently, in terms of the underlying polynomial interpretation, the master
server needs to collect a number of evaluations of the polynomial Fa (z)Fb (z) equal
to the degree of Fa (z)Fb (z) plus one. This computation is of complexity order
O(T DPR (log(PR ))2 ) [37]. Furthermore, the communication load is given as
CL = P R

TD
,
td

where T D/(td) is the size of each matrix Fa (z)Fb (z).
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(3.16)
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Figure 3.4 Construction of the time block sequences a∗ = [a, r] and b∗ = [b, r0 ] in (3.20)
and (3.21) used to define the SGPD code for the case s < t. The zero dashed lines in b and
r0 indicate all-zero block sequences.

3.4

Secure PolyDot Code

In this section, we propose a novel extension of the GPD code that is able to ensure
the secrecy constraint for any PC < P . We also derive the corresponding achievable
set of triples (PC , PR , CL ). As we will discuss, the projection of this set onto the plane
defined by the condition PC = 0 includes the set of pairs (PR , CL ) in (3.15) and (3.16)
obtained by the GPD code [35]. The proposed secure GPD (SGPD) code augments
matrices A and B by adding PC random block matrices to the input matrices A
and B, in a manner similar to prior works [81, 113, 22, 56, 32], yielding augmented
matrices A∗ and B∗ . As we will see, a direct application of the GPD codes to these
matrices is suboptimal.
In contrast, we propose a novel way to construct sequences a∗ and b∗ from
matrices A∗ and B∗ that enables the definition of a more efficient code by means of
the z-transform approach discussed in the previous section. To this end, we follow the
design criterion of decreasing the recovery threshold PR for a given communication
load CL . Based on the discussion in the previous section, this goal can be realized
by decreasing the length of the sequence c∗ = a∗ ∗ b∗ , which can in turn be ensured
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by reducing the length of the sequence b∗ for a given length of the sequence a∗ . We
accomplish this objective by (i) adaptively appending rows or columns with random
elements to matrix A, and, correspondingly columns or rows to B, which can reduce
the recovery threshold; and (ii) modifying the zero padding procedure (see Figure 3.3)
for the construction of sequence b∗ . In order to account for point (i), we consider
separately the two cases s < t and s ≥ t.

3.4.1

Secure Generalized PolyDot Code: The s < t Case

As illustrated in Figure 3.4, when s < t, we augment the input matrices A and B by
adding
∆PC




PC
=
,
s
∆

(3.17)

random row and column blocks to matrices A and B, respectively. Accordingly, the
t∗ × s augmented block matrix A∗ with t∗ = t + ∆PC is obtained as


 A1,1 . . . A1,s 


..
..
..


.
.
.


 




At,1 . . . At,s 
 A  
∗
,
A =
=




R
 R1,1 . . . R1,s 


..
..
..


.
.
.




R∆PC ,1 . . . R∆PC ,s

(3.18)

while the s × d∗ augmented matrix B∗ = [B R0 ] with d∗ = d + ∆PC is obtained as


0
0
 B1,1 . . . B1,d Rs,1 . . . Rs,∆PC 
 .

..
..
..
..
..
.
..
B∗ = 
(3.19)
.
.
.
.
.




Bs,1 . . . Bs,d R01,1 . . . R01,∆P
C

T

S

S

D

In (3.18) and (3.19), if s divides PC , all block matrices Ri,j ∈ F t × s and R0i,j ∈ F s × d

are generated with i.i.d. uniform random elements in F. Otherwise, if ∆PC −PC /s > 0,
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the last s∆PC − PC matrices in (3.18), with right-to-left ordering in the last row of
Ri,j , and in (3.19) with top-to-bottom ordering in the last column of R0i,j , are all-zero
block matrices.
As illustrated in Figure 3.4, in the SGPD scheme, the block sequence a∗ is
defined in the same way as in the conventional GPD, yielding
a∗ = {a1 , . . . , at , r1 , . . . , r∆PC },

(3.20)

where ri is the ith row of the block matrix R, i ∈ [1, ∆PC ]. We also define the time
block sequence b∗ = {b, r0 } as
b∗ = {b1 , 0, b2 , 0, . . . , bd , 0, r01 , r02 , . . . , r0∆P },

(3.21)

C

where 0 is block sequences of s(t∗ − 1) all-zero block matrices, respectively, with
dimensions S/s × D/d, while r0j is the jth column of the random matrix R0 . The key
novel idea of this construction is that no zero matrices are introduced between the
columns of matrix R0 . As shown in Theorem 5 below, this construction allows the
master server to recover all the desired submatrices Ci,j for i ∈ [1, t] and j ∈ [1, d]
from the middle samples of the convolutions ci,j = ai ∗ bj (see Figure 3.5 for an
illustration).
Theorem 5. For a given security level PC < P , the proposed SGPD code achieves
the recovery threshold




tsd + s − 1,




PR = t∗ s(d + 1) + s∆PC − 1,






t∗ s(d + 1) − s∆PC + 2PC − 1,

if PC = 0,
if PC ≥ 1 and ∆PC =

PC
,
s

if PC ≥ 1 and ∆PC >

PC
,
s

(3.22)

and the communication load (3.16), where t∗ = t + ∆PC and d∗ = d + ∆PC for any
integer values t, s, and d such that s < t, m = ts, and n = sd.
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Proof. The z-transform of sequences a∗ and b∗ are given respectively as
Fa∗ (z) =

t X
s
X

A∗i,j z s(i−1)+(j−1)

i=1 j=1

|

∆

{z

}

= F1 (z)
t∗

+

s
X X

A∗i,j z s(i−1)+j−1 ,

(3.23)

i=t+1 j=1

|

{z

∆

}

= F2 (z)

Fb∗ (z) =

s X
d
X

∗ s(l−1)

B∗k,l z s−k+t

|k=1

l=1

s
X

d∗
X

∆

{z

}

= F3 (z)

+

∗ sd+s(l−d)−k

B∗k,l z t

.

(3.24)

k=1 l=d+1

|

{z

∆

}

= F4 (z)

The master server evaluates Fa∗ (z) and Fb∗ (z) at P non-zero distinct points
z1 , . . . , zP ∈ F, which define the encoding functions, and sends both matrices
Ap = Fa∗ (zp ) and Bp = Fb∗ (zp ) to worker p. Worker p performs the multiplication
Fa∗ (zp )Fb∗ (zp ), and sends the results back to the master server. To reconstruct
all blocks Ci,j of matrix C = AB, the master server carries out a polynomial
interpolation, or equivalently, it computes the inverse z-transform, upon receiving
a number of multiplication results equal to at least the length of the sequence
P
c∗ = a∗ ∗ b∗ . As we detail next, the (i, l) block Ci,l = sr=1 Ai,r Br,l , for all i ∈ [1, t]
and l ∈ [1, d], of matrix C = AB can be seen equal to the (si − 1 + (l − 1)t∗ s)th
sample of the convolution c∗ = a∗ ∗ b∗ . An illustration can be found in Figure 3.5.
To see this, we first note that, by the properties of GPD codes, matrix Ci,l
∗s

is the coefficient of the monomial z si−1+(l−1)t

in F1 (z)F3 (z). Note that this holds

since the polynomial F1 (z) and F3 (z) are defined as GPD codes. We now need to
show that no other contribution to this term arises from the products F1 (z)F4 (z),
F2 (z)F3 (z), and F2 (z)F4 (z). The terms in the product F1 (z)F4 (z) have exponents
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Figure 3.5 Outcome of the communication Ci,j = ai ∗ bj for t = 3, s = 2, d = 2, and
PC = 2. Dashed blue stems with filled markers represent the convolution c∗ . Individual
convolutions ci,j are shown in different colors with square markers. Contributions from one
or both random matrices are shown as red crosses. The desired submatrices Ci,j are seen
to equal the corresponding samples from the sequence c∗ , associated with the center points
of the individual convolutions.

(t∗ sd + s(i − 1) + s(l − d) − 1), for i ∈ [1, t] and l ∈ [d + 1, d∗ ], which do not include the
desired values (si−1+(l−1)t∗ s) for i ∈ [1, t] and l ∈ [1, d]. A similar discussion applies
to the product F2 (z)F3 (z), whose exponents are (s(i + t∗ l − t∗ ) − 1), for i ∈ [t + 1, t∗ ]
and l ∈ [1, d], and F2 (z)F4 (z), whose exponents are (t∗ sd + s(i − 1) + s(l − d) − 1),
for i ∈ [t + 1, t∗ ] and l ∈ [d + 1, d∗ ].
In order to recover the convolution c∗ , the master server needs to collect a
number of values of the product Fa (z)Fb (z) equal to the length of the sequence c∗ ,
which can be computed as the degree deg (Fa (z)Fb (z)) + 1, where deg(Fa (z)Fb (z))
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Figure 3.6 Construction of the time block sequences a∗ and b∗ in (3.31) and (3.32) used
to define the secure generalized PolyDot (SGPD) code for the case s ≥ t. The solid line and
the zero dashed lines in b∗ indicate columns of B and all-zero block sequences, respectively.

is
deg(Fa (z)Fb (z)) =




t∗ s(d + 1) + s∆

PC

− 1,



dst∗ − s∆PC + 2PC + t − 2,

if ∆PC =

PC
,
s

if ∆PC >

PC
.
s

(3.25)

For PC ≥ 1 this implies the recovery threshold PR in (3.22). The communication load
CL in (3.16) follows from the fact that there are T D/(td) entries in Fa∗ (zp )Fb∗ (zp ),
for all p ∈ [1, PR ].
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The security constraint in Equation (3.3) can be proved in a manner similar to
[22] by the following steps:
I(A, B; AP , BP )
=H(AP , BP ) − H(AP , BP |A, B)
(a)

=H(AP , BP ) − H(AP , BP |A, B)
+ H(AP , BP |A, B, R1 , . . . , RPC , R01 , . . . , R0PC )
=H(AP , BP) − I(AP , BP ; R1 , . . . , RPC , R01 , . . . , R0PC |A, B)
=H(AP , BP ) − H(R1 , . . . , RPC , R01 , . . . , R0PC |A, B)
+ H(R1 , . . . , RPC , R01 , . . . , R0PC |A, B, AP , BP )

(b)

=H(AP , BP ) − H(R1 , . . . , RPC , R01 , . . . , R0PC )

(c)

≤H(AP ) + H(BP ) −

PC
X

H(Rp ) −

PC
X

H(R0p )

p=1

p=1

TS
SD
log |F| − PC
log |F|
m
n
PC
PC
X
(e) X
TS
SD
H(Ap ) +
H(Bp ) − PC
≤
log |F| − PC
log |F|
m
n
p=1
p=1

(d)

=H(AP ) + H(BP ) − PC

(f )

TS
SD
TS
log |F| + PC
log |F| − PC
log |F|
m
n
m
SD
− PC
log |F|
n

= PC

=0,

(3.26)

where (a) follows from the definition of encoding functions, since AP is a deterministic
function of A and Rp , and BP is a deterministic function of B and R0p , respectively, for
all p ∈ [1, PC ]; (b) follows from Equations (3.23) and (3.24), since from PR polynomial
evaluations AP and BP in Equations (3.23) and (3.24) we can recover 2PC unknowns
when the coefficients Ai,j and Bk,l are known, given that we have PR ≥ 2PC ; (c)
and (d) follows since Rp and R0p are independent uniformly distributed entries; (e)
follows by upper bounding the joint entropy using the sum of individual entropies;
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and (f ) follows from an argument similar to (d). Hence, the proposed scheme is
information-theoretically secure.
Remark 2. When PC ≥ 1 a direct application of the GPD construction in Figure
3.3 would yield the larger recovery threshold



t∗ sd∗ + s − 1,
PR =


dst∗ + s − 1 − 2(s∆PC − PC ),
3.4.2

if ∆PC =

PC
,
s

if ∆PC >

PC
.
s

(3.27)

Secure Generalized PolyDot Code: The s ≥ t Case

As illustrated in Figure 3.6, when s ≥ t, we instead augment input matrices A and
B by adding
∆
∆0PC =



PC
min {t, d}


(3.28)

column and row blocks to matrices A and B. This can be seen to yield a smaller
recovery threshold. Accordingly, the t × s∗ augmented block matrix A∗ = [A R] with
s∗ = s + ∆0PC is obtained as

 A1,1 . . . A1,s R1,1 . . . R1,∆0PC
 .
..
..
..
...
...
.
A∗ = 
.
.
.
 .

At,1 . . . At,s Rt,1 . . . Rt,∆0P




,



(3.29)

C

while the s∗ × d augmented block matrix B∗ is

0
 R∆0PC ,1

..

.

 


0
R01,1
 R  
∗

B =
=
 
 B1,1
B


..

.


Bs,1
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defined as
...
..

.

R0∆0
P
..
.

C ,d

...

R01,d

...
..
.

B1,d
..
.

...

Bs,d









.








(3.30)

As for (3.29) and (3.30), if ∆0PC −PC / min{t, d} > 0, the last s∆0PC −PC block matrices
in Equation (3.29), with bottom-to-top right-to-left ordering in R, and in Equation
(3.30) with right-to-left top-to-bottom ordering in R0 , are all-zero block matrices.
The construction of sequences a∗ and b∗ is analogous to the GPD in the non-secure
case. In particular, as seen in Figure 3.6, the time block sequence a∗ is
a∗ = {a1 , r1 , a2 , r2 , . . . , at , rt },

(3.31)

whereas the block sequence b∗ is defined as
b∗ = {b1 , 0, b2 , . . . , 0, bd , 0̂, r0∆0P , . . . , r01 }.

(3.32)

C

Here, 0 and 0̂ are a block sequence of t and t−1 all-zero block matrices with dimensions
S/s × D/d, respectively, while r0i is the ith row of the random matrix R0 .
Theorem 6. For a given security level PC < P , the proposed SGPD code achieves
the recovery threshold
PR = t(s∗ d − ∆0PC ) + ts + 2PC − 1

(3.33)

and the communication load in Equation (3.16), where s∗ = s + ∆0PC for any integer
values t, s, and d such that s ≥ t, m = ts, and n = sd.
Proof. We define the z-transform of sequences a∗ and b∗ respectively as
F (z) =
a∗

t X
s
X

A∗i,j z i−1+t(j−1)

i=1 j=1
∗

+

t
s
X
X

A∗i,j z i−1+t(j−1) ,

(3.34)

i=1 j=s+1
∗

s
X

Fb∗ (z) =

d
X

k=1+∆0P

C

∗ −k)t+ts∗ (l−1)

B∗k,l z (s

l=1

∆0P

+

d
C X
X

B∗k,l z

t(s∗ d−∆0P )+d(∆0P −k)+l−1

k=1 l=1
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C

C

.

(3.35)

The (i, l) block Ci,l =

Ps

r=1

Ai,r Br,l , for all i ∈ [1, t] and l ∈ [1, d], of matrix C = AB

can be seen equal to the (i − 1 + t(s∗ l − 1))th sample of the convolution c∗ = a∗ ∗ b∗ .
The rest of the proof follows in a manner akin to Theorem 5.
Remark 3. The computational complexity of SGPD codes for both workers and
master server can be summarized as follows. Each worker is assigned to compute
the multiplication Cp = Ap Bp , requiring T SD/(tsd) multiplications.

For the

master server, encoding matrices Ap and Bp at each worker amounts to evaluating
z-transforms Fa∗ (z) and Fb∗ (z) at a random point zp . This requires multiplying zp
by (ts + PC ) and (sd + PC ) submatrices, each of dimension T /t × S/s and S/s × D/d,
respectively. This requires PC (T S/(ts)+SD/(sd))+T S+SD multiplications. Overall,
the master server needs to carry out P PC (T S/(ts) + SD/(sd)) + P (T S + SD)
multiplications. For decoding, the master server interpolates a polynomial degree
PR −1 for each element in C. Using a polynomial interpolation algorithm, the decoding
complexity amounts to (PR − 1)(log(PR − 1))2 T D/(td) multiplications [64].
Example 2. We now provide some numerical results of the proposed SGPD scheme.
We set P = 3000 workers and parameters m = n = 36. The trade-off between
communication load CL and recovery threshold PR for both non-secure conventional
GPD codes (PC = 0) and proposed SGPD code with colluding workers PC = 11
and PC = 29 is illustrated in Figure 3.7. The figure quantifies the loss in terms of
achievable pairs (PR , CL ) that is caused by the security constraint.

3.4.3

Trading Off Computation and Communication Latencies

In this subsection, we elaborate on the importance of enabling a flexible trade-off
between communication load and recovery threshold by analyzing the overall
completion time for the matrix multiplication task at hand. The completion delay is
the sum of latencies due to computation and communication.
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Figure 3.7 Communication load CL versus recovery threshold PR for both non-secure
generalized PolyDot (GPD) and secure generalized PolyDot (SGPD) codes (m = n = 36
and P = 3000 workers).

To this end, following a well-established model [66], we assume that computation
at each worker p requires a random time Tpcomp , measured in some specified unit
of time, that is modeled as a shifted exponential distribution with cumulative
distribution function (cdf)
F

comp

(T

comp



µT SD comp
comp
) = 1 − exp −
(T
− Tmin ) ,
tsd

(3.36)

comp
for T ≥ Tmin
and F comp (T ) = 0 otherwise. According to (3.36), the parameter
comp
Tmin
represents the minimum processing time, and 1/µ represents the average
comp
excess computing time, with respect to Tmin
, per multiplication (recall Remark

3). Assuming independent computing times, for a given recovery threshold PR , the
computation time T comp is hence given as the PR th-order statistic, i.e., the PR th
smallest variable, among the i.i.d. variables (T1comp , . . . , TPcomp ). Its expectation is

66

102

100

10-2

10-4
106

108

1010

1012

Figure 3.8 Average completion time E[T ] versus communication rate Rcomm for secure
generalized PolyDot (SGPD) codes with P = 3000, PC = 29, T = S = D = 1008, µ =
0.5 × 10−4 , and T comp = 1, and m = n = 36: (i) t = d = 36, s = 1 (SGPD code), (ii)
t = s = d = 6, and (iii) t = d = 1, s = 36 (secure MatDot code).

given by [89]
P

E[T

comp

R
1
tsd
tsd X
=
(HP − HP−PR ),
]=
µT SD i=1 P −PR +i µT SD

where HP is the generalized harmonic number defined as HP =

PP

i=1

(3.37)

1/i.

Suppose now that the workers communicate with the master server are a link
with an overall download rate Rcomm (symbols per unit time). The communication
latency is hence given as
T comm = PR
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TD
,
tdRcomm

(3.38)

since the workers need to return PR T D/(td) symbols to the master server. Overall,
the average completion time is given as
comp
E[T ] = Tmin
+

tsd
TD
(HP − HP −PR ) + PR
.
µT SD
tdRcomm

(3.39)

Example 3. Let consider P = 3000 workers and parameters m = n = 36. We
comm
assume that PC = 29, T = S = D = 1008, µ = 0.5 × 10−4 , and Tmin
= 1. We

compare the performance of the following SGPD codes: (i) t = d = 36 and s = 1
(secure Polynomial code); (ii) t = s = d = 6; (iii) t = d = 1 and s = 36 (secure
MatDot code). The values of CL and PR for these codes are shown in Figure 3.7. The
average completion time (3.39) is plotted versus the communication rate Rcomm in
Figure 3.8. The figure shows that the optimal choice of the latency-minimizing SGPD
code along the curve in Figure 3.7 depends on the system’s operating point: For small
communication rates, it is preferable to reduce the communication load CL , and hence
secure Polynomial codes are the best choice; while for large communication rate, it is
optimal to choose codes with an increasingly large value of the communication load
CL .

3.5

Secure and Private Generalized PolyDot Code

In this section, we study the setup shown in Figure 3.2. We propose a variant of
the private and secure GPD code introduced in [61] that we refer to as private and
secure GPD (PSGPD) code. Note that in [61] a private coded matrix multiplication
scheme is proposed only for Polynomial codes with s = 1 in (3.11). We derive the
corresponding achievable set of pairs (PR , CL ) as defined in Section 3.2 under the
condition PC = 1, i.e., the workers do not collude.
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Theorem 7. For a given security level PC = 1, there is an achievable PSGPD codes
with the recovery threshold

PR =




s(t + 1)d,

if s < t,



ts(d + 1) − t + 1,

if s ≥ t,

(3.40)

and the communication load (3.16), for any integer values t, s, and d such that m = ts,
and n = sd.
Proof. We start by discussing the s < t case, as done in Section 3.4. The polynomial
encoding function for the input matrix A, is obtained is defined as in (3.23) for
PC = 1, that is
FA (z) =

t X
s
X

Ai,j z s(i−1)+(j−1) + Rz st ,

(3.41)

i=1 j=1

where we recall that R is an T /t × S/s random matrix with i.i.d. uniform random
(κ)

elements in F. The encoded matrices are given as Ap

= FA (zκ,p ) for values zκ,p

to be discussed below. For the desired index κ, the master server also computes the
(κ)

query vector qp for all p ∈ [1, P ]. This is obtained as
q(κ)
p = [z1 , . . . , zκ−1 , zκ,p , zκ+1 , . . . , zL ],

(3.42)

where all points {zi }i6=κ are selected uniformly i.i.d. from F but are identical for all
p. The points {zκ,p }Pp=1 are selected i.i.d. as distinct elements from F (recall that we
have |F| > P ). We note that, as in the private information retrieval scheme [61], the
query vector (3.42) does not leak any information on index κ in the sense defined by
condition (3.9). The master server evaluates FA (z) in (3.41) at the distinct random
(κ)

point zκ,p , to produce the encoded matrices Ap

(κ)

= FA (zκ,p ), and then sends Ap

(κ)

along with the query vector qp to worker p ∈ [1, P ].
(κ)

Each worker p, after receiving the query vectors qp , encodes the library B into
(κ)

a matrix Bp

as follows. Define the polynomial encoding function for each matrix
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B(r) , r ∈ [1, L], in the library B as in (3.24) for PC = 0, i.e.,
FB(r) (z) =

s X
d
X

(r)

Bk,l z s−k+(l−1)s(t+1) .

(3.43)

k=1 l=1

Each worker p computes the encoded matrices as
∆

X

B(κ)
p =

FB(r) ([q(κ)
p ]r )

r∈[1,L]

=FB(κ) (zκ,p ) +

X

FB(r) (zr ),

(3.44)

r∈[1,L]\κ

(κ)

(κ)

where [qp ]r denotes the rth element of the query vector qp .
(κ)

After encoding the library, each worker p computes the matrix product Cp =
(κ)

(κ)

A p Bp

(κ)

and then sends Cp

back to the master server.

We note that both

polynomials FA (z) and FB(κ) (z), assigned to the input matrix A and the desired
matrix B(κ) , are evaluated at the same random points zκ,1 , . . . , zκ,P for workers
1, . . . , P , respectively.

Since each undesired matrix is evaluated at an identical
P
random point for all workers the second term in (3.44), i.e., r∈[1,L]\κ FB(r) (zr ), can
be considered as a constant term.
(κ)

To reconstruct all blocks Ci,l of the product matrix C(κ) = AB(κ) , the master
server carries out polynomial interpolation, upon receiving a number of multiplication
results equal to at least deg(FA (z)GB(κ) (z)) + 1, which is s(t + 1)d, for the case s < t.
Similarly, for the s ≥ t case, the polynomial encoding function for the input
matrix A as in (3.34) for PC = 1, that is,
FA (z) =

t X
s
X

Ai,j z i−1+t(j−1) + Rz ts ,

(3.45)

i=1 j=1

and the encoding function for matrices B(r) is given as in (3.35) for PC = 0, that is
FB(r) (z) =

s X
d
X

(r)

Bk,l z (s−k)t+ts(l−1) .

k=1 l=1
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(3.46)

(κ)

(κ)

The encoded matrices Ap and Bp are defined as above, and so are the query vectors
(κ)

qp for all p ∈ [1, P ].
The security of the data matrix A against non-colluding workers is guaranteed
by appending the random matrix R to the input matrix A in (3.41) in the same way
as described in Section 3.4. The details for both cases s < t and s ≥ t are given in
the proofs of Theorems 5 and 6, respectively, for the case of PC = 1. The privacy
condition of (3.9) follows by definition of the query vectors (3.42) for the desired index
κ ∈ [1, L], as proved in [61]. Finally, the recovery threshold and the communication
load follow in a manner analogous to Theorems 5 and 6.
Remark 4. The computational complexity of PSGPD codes for both workers and
master server is summarized as follows. In PSGPD codes, each worker has two duties,
(κ)

namely encoding the library B and computing the multiplication Cp
(κ)

Encoding the library, i.e., computing the matrix Bp

(κ)

(κ)

= Ap Bp .

in (3.44), requires to evaluate

(κ)

FB(r) (z), r ∈ [1, L] at query vector qp . Hence, the former task requires LSD
multiplications, while the latter entails T SD/(tsd) multiplications. In total, each
worker carries out LSD + T SD/(tsd) multiplications. The master server encodes
(κ)

matrix Ap

with (1 + ts)T S/(ts) multiplications. In total, for all P workers, the

master server needs P (1 + ts)T S/(ts) multiplications. The computation complexity of
the decoding complexity of the master server is the same as for SGPD codes, namely
O((PR − 1)(log(Pr − 1))2 T D/(td))).
Example 4. Let us consider P = 3000 workers and parameters m = n = 36. We
assume that PC = 1 in order to compare the performance of proposed SGPD and
PSGPD codes. Note that both recovery threshold and communication load of the
PSGPD code do not depend on the number of public matrices |B| = L in the library.
The trade-off between communication load CL and recovery threshold PR is illustrated
in Figure 3.9 for both codes. The figure shows that, for a fixed value of PR , the
resulting achievable value of the communication load CL is smaller for PSGPD than
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Figure 3.9 Communication load CL versus recovery threshold PR for secure generalized
PolyDot (SGPD) codes with PC = 1 and private and secure generalized PolyDot (PSGPD)
codes (m = n = 36 and P = 3000 workers).

for SGPD codes. This suggests that the privacy requirement on the index κ imposed
by PSGPD is less demanding than the security constraint on matrix B under which
SGPD codes operate.
Remark 5. As for SGPD codes, the overall average completion time of PSGPD codes
can be derived following the same steps as described in Section 3.4.3.

3.6

Discussion and Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, we have considered the problem of secure and private distributed
matrix multiplication on C = AB in terms of design of computational codes for two
settings. In the first setting, the two matrices A and B contain confidential data
and must be kept secure from the workers; and in the second setting , matrix A is
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confidential, while matrix B is selected in a private manner from a library of public
matrices. For both problems, this work presents the best currently known trade-off
between communication load and recovery threshold. This is done by presenting two
code constructions that generalize the state-of-the-art GPD codes [39, 37, 35], in
combination with private information retrieval based codes [61].
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

In this dissertation, the problem of using codes to speed up distributed computing
systems is studied.
In Chapter 2, we study distributed computing framework, when the input files
distributedly stored on the uplink of a cloud radio access network architecture. It
focuses in which decoding at the cloud takes place via network function virtualization
on commercial off-the-shelf servers. In order to mitigate the impact of straggling
decoders in this platform, a novel coding strategy is proposed, whereby the cloud reencodes the received frames via a linear code before distributing them to the decoding
processors. Transmission of a single frame is considered first, and upper bounds on
the resulting frame unavailability probability as a function of the decoding latency are
derived by assuming a binary symmetric channel for uplink communications. Then,
the analysis is extended to account for random frame arrival times. In this case, the
trade-off between an average decoding latency and the frame error rate is studied for
two different queuing policies, whereby the servers carry out per-frame decoding or
continuous decoding, respectively. Numerical examples demonstrate that the bounds
are useful tools for code design and that coding is instrumental in obtaining a desirable
compromise between decoding latency and reliability.
In Chapter 3, we consider large matrix multiplications. These operations are
often carried out on a distributed computing platform with a master server and
multiple workers in the cloud operating in parallel. For such distributed platforms,
in addition to exact recovery requirements, security and privacy constraints on
the data matrices are imposed, and the recovery threshold as a function of the
communication load is studied. First, it is assumed that both matrices contain private
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information and that workers can collude to eavesdrop on the content of these data
matrices. For this problem, a novel class of secure codes is introduced, referred to
as secure generalized PolyDot codes, that generalize state-of-the-art non-secure codes
for matrix multiplication. Secure generalized PolyDot codes allow a flexible trade-off
between recovery threshold and communication load for a fixed maximum number of
colluding workers while providing perfect secrecy for the two data matrices. Then, a
connection between secure matrix multiplication and private information retrieval is
studied. It is assumed that one of the data matrices is taken from a public set known
to all the workers. In this setup, the identity of the matrix of interest should be kept
private from the workers. For this model, a variant of generalized PolyDot codes is
presented that can guarantee both secrecy of one matrix and privacy for the identity
of the other matrix for the case of no colluding servers.
In summary we show that
• Coded distributed computing systems allows reliable and timely channel
decoding in a C-RAN architecture based on distributed unreliable processors
rather than uncoded ones;
• Coding can provide a systematic way to add redundancy into distributed
algorithms so that their runtime is not affected by stragglers;
• We introduce the dependency graph of a linear code and its chromatic number
as novel relevant parameters of a linear code and;
• We introduce a novel class of secure codes, referred to as secure generalized
PolyDot codes. We also propose a secure and private class of codes called
private ans secure generalized PolyDot codes for matrix multiplication.

4.1

Future Research Directions

Among interesting open problems, we mention the design of optimal NFV codes
and the extension of the principle of NFV coding to other channels. Note that the
approach proposed here applies directly to other additive noise channels in which the
user code is an additive group. A key example is the additive Gaussian channel with
lattice codes at the user.
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Also, we focus on private secure generalized PolyDot schemes for any number of
colluding workers that provides a smaller computational complexity at the workers.
Finally, the establishment of a converse bound and the consideration of nonperfect
communication channels between workers and master server are open problems.
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